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Equality Rights in the Federal 
Independent Immigrant Selection Criteria 
Walter CHI YAN TOM * 
L'impact potentiel du droit à l'égalité de la Charte canadienne sur le 
système d'immigration canadienne est important. Bien que le droit de l'immi-
gration soit intrinsèquement discriminatoire, le rôle du droit à l'égalité 
demeure d'une importance primordiale par rapport aux distinctions fondées 
sur les motifs énumérés à l'article 15 de la Charte ainsi que sur les motifs qui 
leur sont analogues. 
L'objectif de cet article est d'examiner les critères fédéraux de sélection 
des immigrants indépendants, et d'évaluer leur conformité aux exigences de 
l'article 15 de la Charte selon l'interprétation jurisprudentielle de la Cour 
suprême du Canada. 
The potential impact of fundamental guarantees in favour of equality on 
the Canadian immigration system is significant. Although immigration law is 
inherently unequal, the role of equality rights is still of primary importance in 
distinctions based on the enumerated and analogous grounds ofs. 15 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the federal independent 
immigrant selection criteria and to assess its conformity to the standards of 
s. 15 of the Charter, according to recent judicial interpretation by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
* Étudiant, Faculté de droit, Université Laval. Il remercie les professeurs Alain Prujiner et 
Henri Brun pour leurs conseils et leur patience. 
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The admission of aliens into Canada is, as 
stated above, by law a privilege extended to 
persons seeking admission and is not a right 
that is exercised quasi-unilaterally by them. 
Cronan v. M.M.I. ' 
L'idée de démocratie n'a aucun sens si elle ne 
repose par sur l'égalité des membres de la com-
munauté : la souveraineté du Parlement ne peut 
en effet se justifier que si elle repose sur le peuple 
dans sa totalité. 
C.J. FRIEDRICH, 
"La crise de l'égalitarisme"2 
1. (1973) 3/./I.C. 84, p. 126. 
2. L'égalité, vol. 1, Bruxelle, Bruylant, 1971, p. 307. 
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The potential impact of fundamental guarantees in favour of equality 
before and under the law, as well as protection of the law, on the Canadian 
immigration system is significant. The primary function of immigration law 
in singling out specific groups for differential treatment, regarding their legal 
rights of admission into Canada, may be seen, prima facie, as a violation of 
guarantees of equal treatment3. Also, the fact that immigration is internally 
selective and provides different statutory rights and privileges to aliens within 
the same class of persons to whom immigration legislation is applicable, 
should suggest similar forms of analyses. At the very least, the government 
will have realized that unequal treatment in law and administrative practice 
may have to be justified as reasonable, given a free and democratic society4. 
Immigration and admission to Canada, as has been noted by the courts, 
are seen as privileges to be determined by statute and regulation, rather than a 
matter of rights5. A basic premise of any immigration system is that it must be 
able to make these distinctions regarding to classes of people in terms of their 
rights and privileges, as an exercice of the State sovereignty6. International 
law and State practice demonstrate that such distinctions are most often 
drawn of the basis of citizenship and nationality7. Immigration law itself is 
inherently unequal in terms of its application to citizens and aliens, thus the 
alien/ citizen inequality, for the most part, is difficulty challenged8. 
The role of equality rights is still of a primordial importance in distinctions 
based on the enumerated and analogous grounds of s. 15 of the Charter, such 
as race and religion, which are entirely inappropriate and of a discriminatory 
nature9. The objective of this paper is to examine the independent immigrant 
3. S. 15 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is Part I of the Constitution Act 
of 1982 ; hereinafter referred to as the Charter, as exposed in C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, Canadian 
Immigration Law and Procedure, Aurora, Canada Law Book, 1983, p. 460. 
4. Id. and s. 1 of the Charter. 
5. S. 5 ans s. 8 of Immigrations Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, concerning admission to 
Canada ; Cronan, supra, note 1 ; Masella v. Langlais, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 263, p. 281, Vaaro v. 
The King, [1933] S.C.R. 36, p. 42 ; Praia v. Minislery of Manpower & Immigration, [1976] 
1 S.C.R. 376, p. 380; among others. 
6. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 468 ; J.H. GREY, Immigration Law in Canada, Toronto, 
Buttersworth, 1984, p. 7 ; H. BRUN and G. TREMBLAY, Droit constitutionnel, Cowansville, 
Éditions Yvon Biais, 1982, p. 144. 
7. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 14—16 ; I. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International 
Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973, p. 505. 
8. J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 152; H. BRUN and C. BRUNELLE, "Les statuts respectifs de 
citoyen, résident et étranger à la lumière des chartes des droits", (1988) 29 C. de D. 689. 
9. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 469; H. BRUN and C. BRUNELLE, supra, note 8, 
p. 711-713 ; R. ANAND, "Ethnie Equality", in A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts,eds., Equality 
Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Toronto, Carswell, 1985, 
p. 121-122. 
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selection criteria10 and to assess its conformity to the standards of s. 15 of the 
Charter, according to the recent jurisprudential interpretation by the Supreme 
Court of Canada of equality rights ". The first part of the study deals with the 
points system and the scope of discrimination in s. 15 the Charter, in 
particular, the range of application of equality rights, and the definition of 
discrimination and its application to the points system. The second part 
examines the reasonable limits of equality rights by discussing the role of 
multicultural rights12 in the immigration law and applying the test of 
justification13 to the selection criteria, given that discrimination is present 
according to s. 15. The study will conclude with a related discussion of the 
present problem of abuse in the refugee system, a critique on the business 
immigration program, and problems of discrimination in the immigration 
system as a whole. 
Before continuing with the study, it is important to examine the historical 
development of Canadian immigration policy, and especially the evolutionary 
process of legislative change, to fully appreciate current Canadian immigration 
law. Our present laws are an outgrowth of former policies and legislative 
history, and this history has established the pattern for the immigration law 
which comprises our present regime14. 
Pre-Confederation immigration policy was characterized by few controls 
and little planning as the British government searched for methods to gain 
numerical superiority of the anglophone population over the dominant 
francophone population in Quebec15. 
The period from Confederation to the Second World War saw the 
development of a philosophy of immigration, which for the most part, is still 
present in modern administration. The exclusionary nature of the Immigration 
Acts of 1869 and 187216, their discretionary procedures, and their short term 
policies based on domestic economic stability have served as models for the 
present-day legislation l7. The negative selection process excluded immigrants 
10. Schedule I s. 8-11 of Immigration Regulations, 1978, S.O.R./78-172 and amended up to 
26/01/90; hereinafter referred to as the selection criteria or points system; also s. 6 of 
Immigration Act, 1976 concerning immigrant selection. 
11. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 1296. 
12. S. 27 of the Charter. 
13. S. 1 of the Charter. 
14. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 39; J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 15. 
15. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 40-42 ;G. HERSAKandD. THOMAS, Recent Canadian 
Developments Arising from International Migration — Research Abstract, Ottawa, 
Employment and Immigration Canada, 1988, p. 5. 
16. S.C. 1869, c. 10, as amended by S.C. 1872, c. 28. 
17. J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 11-12; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 42-43. 
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who were not of the Anglo Saxon Protestant mould, and discriminated 
particularly against the Orientals ans Asiatics 18. By the end of the great 
migration of the early 20th century, Canadian immigration law and policy 
had undergone a major revision, from a basically unrestricted immigration to 
a highly selective and controlled system. While the main purpose behind 
earlier immigration philosophy was aimed at filling the vast agricultural land 
with farmers and their families, after World War I immigrants were solicited 
for their labour skills and training.19 
The Immigration Act of 195220 was an attempt to clarify and simplify 
immigration policy, while retaining its highly selective nature. Discrimination 
remained an outward feature of immigration policy through the use of 
national origin preferences made possible by the wide regulatory powers of 
the Minister21. However, by the early 1960's the vast majority of legal 
restrictions on immigrant admission based on national origins were eliminated, 
with a shift in emphasis to a more labour oriented criteria22. 
The publication of the White Paper on Immigration of 196623 brought 
on major revisions in immigration policy concerning economic prosperity, 
population increase and administrative fairness. In order to relate selection to 
labour needs, an improved and novel selection process was instituted by the 
enactment of the Norms for Assessment or points system24. Prospective 
immigrants could apply for admission within Canada, instead from only their 
country of origin, and be evaluated in the same manner as those who followed 
normal procedure25. Finally, the establishment of a permanent Immigration 
Appeal Board would ensure that the administration of new policy would be 
18. Chinese Immigration Act, S.C. 1885, c. 71 and Chinese Immigration Act, S.C. 1923, c. 38. 
An outstanding feature of this legislation was its "head tax", or entry fee, charged against all 
Chinese who wished to immigrate to Canada ; R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 86-88 ; G. HERSAK 
and D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 6; J.S. WOODSWORTH, Stranger within our Gates, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 232. The book was first published in 1909 
and served as a pioneer sociological study of Canadian immigrant life-styles. 
19. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 49-55 ; J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 12. 
20. R.S.C. 1952, c. 325. 
21. See also CORBETT, Canada's Immigration Policy: A Critique, Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1957, p. 66-74. 
22. See also HAWKINS, Canada and Immigration Public Policy and Public Concern, Montreal, 
McGill — Queen's University Press, 1972, p. 119-138 ; G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, supra, 
note 15, p. 6. 
23. DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION, White Paper on Immigration, Ottawa, 
Queen's Printer, 1966; see also G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 6. 
24. Supra, note 10. 
25. S. 34 of Immigration Regulations, P.C. 1967-1616, S.O.R./67-434 ; revoked by P.C. 1972-
2502, S.O.R./72-443. 
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carried out in an effective and equitable fashion26. The changes in policy were 
unique and progressive reforms in immigration administration. 
As the Canadian economy began to decline, immigration regulation 
reflected this trend. Canada's "liberal" immigration policy had apparently 
become a source of potential immigrants not envisaged by the regulation 
makers, as official indicated large-scale abuse by persons who would enter 
Canada as visitors, when their true intention was to apply for landed 
immigrant status as soon as practicable. Government response in 1973 was 
geared toward limiting the abuse of the regulatory system, but was characterized 
by a piecemeal approach to the overall problem of developing an equitable 
framework of selection and deportation. The most important development of 
all the changes was the realization that the system then in use was inadequate 
and outmoded27. 
The Green Paper on Immigration Policy, released in 197428, was the 
result of plans for a massive overhaul and review of immigration policy and 
procedures. Rationality of the future policy would be demonstrated by 
linking immigration flow to the economic recession. The Green Paper was 
carefully worded and lacked in-depth analysis of immigration and population 
in Canada's future. The future policy would include stricter admission 
requirements, a reduction in annual immigration population and increased 
contact between immigration flow and the Canadian labour market. The 
focus had shifted once again to a self-serving concentration of Canada's 
domestic needs29. 
The Immigration Act, 197630, based on the recommendations of the 
Green Paper, was increasingly restrictive and labour-oriented. Future policy 
"appeared" to be less haphazard and more inclined to examine the overall 
effects of immigration on the Canadian population in a planned demographic 
manner. The new legislation did make some changes indicating a humanitarian 
concern, but for the most part it was reflective of a policy which placed 
Canada's interest in primacy31. The recent legislation of Bill C-55 and Bill 
26. Immigration Appeal Board Act, R.S.C. 1970, C. 1-3. 
27. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 61-63. 
28. DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION, Green Paper on Immigration Policy, 
Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1974. 
29. Supra, note 28; see also H.G. HOWITH, Immigration Levels Planning: The First Decade, 
Ottawa, Employment and Immigration Canada, 1988, p. 3. 
30. Supra, note 10. 
31. EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, Canada's Immigration Law, Ottawa, Minister 
of Supply and Services Canada, 1989, p. 1 ; see also C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 65. 
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C-8432, concerning refugee law reform through the steadfast commitment of 
the government to the interposition of political and administrative discretion 
in what should be a human rights-based protection system, simply reaffirms 
the selectivity of Canada's concern for refugees33. 
In summation, the present legislation is a product of immigration 
policies developed since the beginning of British control. A philosophy of 
exclusion has been attenuated by some forms of positive selection, but the 
policy of restraint is still dominant. Planned demographic growth is a prime 
feature of the modern policy but as a result, immigration law remains 
complex and subject to both frequent change and potential abuse of discretio-
nary power. The dominant values are economic and controlled flow of labour 
and it is unlikely that any major shift in emphasis will occur in the near 
future34. 
As immigration is essentially a statutory subject, most common law 
relating to immigration matters is of little modern relevance. In this sense, the 
Immigration Act of 1976 is the most important single source of immigration 
law and procedure, wherein all legal rules relating to immigration in Canada 
must find their status of legitimacy35. The present legislation confers wide 
powers to enact regulations on a supplementary source of legal rules. While 
these regulations may not be enacted in a form contrary to the explicit 
requirements of the statute, extensive scope is provided to allow for major 
changes of policy and administration of immigration matters. The major 
source of subsidiary rules enacted the form of delegated legislation, and of 
which is the subject of this study in the Immigration Regulations, 197836. 
The judicial interpretations of the various provisions of the Act and 
regulations by the Immigration Appeal Board, the Trial Division and Appellate 
Division of the Federal Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, and occasionally, 
the provincial superior courts are also essential to an understanding of 
32. Bill C-55: An Act to amend the Immigration Act, 1976, and to amend other Acts in 
consequence thereof, 2d Sess., 33rd Pari., 1986-87; Bill C-84: An Act to amend the 
Immigration Act, 1976 and the Criminal Code in consequence thereof, 2d Sess., 33rd Pari., 
1986-87 ; these bills have since been integrated into their respective laws. 
33. J.C. HATHAWAY, "Postscript-Selective Concern : An Overview of Refugee Law in Canada", 
(1984) 34 McGillLJ. 354, 357; see also B. SEGAL, "Restructuring Canada's Refugee 
Determination Process : A Look at Bills C-55 and C-84", (1988) 29 C. de D. 733, p. 735 ; 
P. DUQUETTE, J. YEDID and M. WEIGEL, "Le projet de loi C-55 : le gouvernement fait 
semblant de protéger les réfugiés", 31/03/88, Le Devoir. 
34. J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 15 ; C.J. WYDRZYNSICI, supra, note 3, p. 66 ; see also G. HERSAK 
and D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 5-6. 
35. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 87-90. 
36. Id. ; J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 103-106; see also F.N. MARROCO and H.M. GOSSETT, 
eds., The Annotated Immigration Act of Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 1988, p. 293. 
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immigration law. Finally of importance to an appreciation of legal principles 
and especially, current immigration policies, are the various administrative 
policy manuals issued to guide immigration officials in the administration of 
the Act. These Immigration Manuals are a valuable source of information 
concerning contemporary immigration policy and practice37. 
1. The Selection Criteria and the Scope of Discrimination in s. 15 
15. (1) [Equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law] 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
(2) [Affirmative action programs] Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, 
program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of 
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged 
because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.38 
1.1. The Range of Application of Equality Rights 
Before applying the test of discrimination of s. 15, the preliminary 
question of what categories of persons may invoke their equality rights, and 
against which parties and what material these rights are opposable, must be 
examined to discover the range of application of s. 15. Only then can the locus 
standi of the immigrant be discussed, in view of the troublesome distinction in 
immigration law over rights and privileges. 
1.1.1. Who's Protected? 
The first constitutional objective of s. 15 (1) is that it is intended to 
protect essentially the individual, all individuals, no matter who they are, by 
stating that they are all judicially at the same level of equality39. The French 
version speaks of "tous" and "personne", while the English version indicates 
that equality rights are for the benefit of "every individual. "The main concern 
of equality rights therefore is centered on the human being as the individual 
beneficiary of equality40. 
37. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 70 ; see also J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 4-5. 
38. Supra, note 3. 
39. W. BLACK and L. SMITH, "Les droits à l'égalité", in G. A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushny, eds., 
La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, Montreal, Wilson et Lafleur Ltée, 1989, p. 678 ; 
D. PROULX, "L'objet des droits constitutionnels à l'égalité", (1988) 29 C. de D. 567, p. 581 ; 
see also P. HOGG, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2 ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1985, p. 798. 
40. Id. 
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Although the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to rule expressly on this 
question, the principal and seemingly the only restriction of the locus standi 
to invoke equality rights, applies to corporations and other artificial entities41. 
The doctrine observes that corporations are judicial creations and not living 
humans. The idea of equality has always been associated with the dignity and 
value of a human being, and by principle, it would be illogical that artificial 
entities become part of a category of beings that are equal by nature. Also, in 
consideration of the objectives of s. 15 concerning the improvement of the 
situation of disadvantaged groups and individuals, the inequitable or arbitrary 
treatment of a human being is of a much greater importance than of a judicial 
being42. 
The recent interpretation of the Supreme Court in Irwin Toy43 of the 
term "everyone" in s. 7 of the Charter44 may be applied analogously to the 
term "every individual" in s. 15 (1). According to the Supreme Court, the 
word "everyone" in s. 7 read in the light of the rest of the section, excludes 
corporations and other artificial entities incapable of enjoying life, liberty or 
security of the person, and includes only human beings. This transposable 
reasoning along with the Supreme Court's definition of discrimination in 
Andrews45 may have effectively decided the question one and for all46. 
1.1.2. What's Protected? 
Who are the persons and what are the domains which have to conform to 
the equality guarantees of s. 15? In Dolphin Delivery*1, the Supreme Court 
41. Id.; see also Smith Kline v. A.G. Canada, [1987] 2 F.C. 359. It was judged that a 
corporation could not invokes. 15 (1) of the Charter. However, its individual inventors and 
employees had locus standi, despite the cession of their copyrights to the corporation. 
42. D. PROULX, supra, note 39 ; W. BLACK and L. SMITH, supra, note 39 ; see also P. BLACHE, 
"Affirmative Action : To Equality Through Inequalities ?"in J.M. Weiller and R.M. Elliot, 
eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
Toronto, Carswell, 1986, p. 180. 
43. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec Attorney General, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. 
44. S. 7 of the Charter concerns the legal rights of life, liberty, and security of person. 
45. Supra, note 11. 
46. Milk Boardv. Clearview Dairy Farms, Inc., (1987) 12 B.C.L.R. (2d) 125. It was judged that 
corporations were excluded from s. 15 (1) protection because artificial beings had none of 
the personal qualities, inherent in human beings. 
47. S.D.G.M.R. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573; W. BLACK and L. SMITH, 
supra, note 39, p. 674-677; R. JURIANSG, "Section 15 and the Human Rights Codes" in 
G.A. Beaudoin, ed., Your Clients and the Charter — Liberté and Equality, Cowansville, 
Yvon Biais, 1988, p. 324-332 ; see also J. WHYTE, "Is the Private Sector Affected by the 
Charter?" in L. Smith and others, eds., Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality 
Rights, Saskatoon, Canadian Human Rights Reporter, 1983, p. 145 s. 
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declared that on the basis of s. 32, the Charter48 applied only to the 
legislatures, the governments and all their legislative, executive, and adminis-
trative activities. Therefore, the Charter does not apply to persons outside of 
the government unless they are in a domain authorized by the legislature. 
Equality is essential in the administration of justice, the application and even 
the content of the law. This interpretation is clear in the French version of 
s. 15. "La loi ne fait acception de personne et s'applique également à tous." So 
both the administrator as well as the legislator are submitted to s. 15, thus 
avoiding the problems faced by the Supreme Court in its application of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights 49. 
In its examination of equality rights in Dolphin Delivery, the Supreme 
Court approved of the reasoning in Blainey50 by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
and declared that this decision illustrated the sort of rapport that must exist 
with the government in order to apply the Charter. However, the Supreme 
Court announced that s. 15 applied because the discrimination in question 
was authorized by law and not because of the lien existing between the 
government and the regulated activity51. 
The following principle can be extrapolated from Dolpin Delivery and 
Blainey in the context of s. 1552. First it seems that the Charter only applies 
when the government has chosen a legislative style of writing that states a 
general prohibition of all discrimination, accompanied with special exclusions, 
and not a style of writing that numbers specific prohibitions, while remaining 
silent on other unmentioned domains, leaving the common law a possibility 
to effect a discrimination de facto. Secondly, when the style used permits, it 
seems the effect of the Charter on laws concerning human rights has been 
more important than foreseen. Governments risk violating equality rights 
even if in authorizing a discrimination, they are simply maintaining a 
principle of common law. 
48. S. 32 of the Charter as concerns its application ; see also Y. DE MONTIGNY, "Section 32 and 
Equality Rights", in A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts, eds., supra, note 9, p. 565 s. 
49. Q. v. Drybones, [1972] S.C.R 282 and A.G. Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349. In the 
first case para. 1 (B) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, was judged to have 
guaranteed equality "before the law" and "under the law," affecting its content, while the 
second case restricted the guarantee to only equality "before the law," not including the 
substance of the law; D. PROULX, supra, note 39, p. 583. 
50. RE Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association, (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 728 (Ont. CA.). A 
section of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1980, c. 340, was judged unconstitutional 
because it excluded the prohibition of sexual discrimination in amateur sports. 
51. W. BLACK and L. SMITH, supra, note 39, p. 675-676; K.H. FOG ARTY, Equality Rights and 
Their Limitations in the Charter, Toronto, Carswell, 1987, p. 354. 
52. Id. ; R. JURIANSG, supra, note 47, p. 342. 
w. CHI YAN TOM Immigration et droit à l'égalité 487 
The definition of the word "law" in s. 52 of the Charter53 may also be 
used in interpreting the meaning of "law" in s. 15. Provided that the word 
"law" has the same meaning in both sections, then s. 15 will have the same 
limitations as that of s. 52 in its range of application54. 
The recent decision of Andrews has perhaps enlarged the definition of 
"law" and consequently the protection from discrimination through the 
application of the "law". Although no problem regarding the scope of the 
word "law" arose in this case because legislation was under attack, La 
Forest J. stated in an obiter : 
I am not prepared to accept at this point that the only significance to be attached 
to the opening words that refer more generally to equality is that protection 
afforded by the section is restricted to discrimination through the application of 
law... It may also be thought to be out of keeping with the broad and generous 
approach given to other Charter rights, not the least of which is s. 7, which is like 
s. 15 is of a generalized character.55 
Therefore, as reasoned by the Supreme Court in Singh56 for s. 7 of the 
Charter, perhaps s. 15 applies not only to decisions of a judicial nature but 
to all decisions susceptible of a discriminatory effect. 
1.1.3. Locus Standi : A Right or a Privilege ? 
Traditionally permission to enter Canada has not been viewed as a right, 
but a privilege to be granted on whatever conditions are deemed appropriate 
by the State. While courts do speak of immigrants having statutory rights or 
those rights which are extended by the State in relation to the administration 
of immigration, the underlying presumption seems to be that immigrants 
have no cause for complaint if legislative rights do not measure up to an 
objective standard offered by concept of overriding fundamental rights. 
Consequently, the view of the elements of immigrant status as privileges 
merely serves government expediency, causes injustice, is detrimental towards 
improvement of the safeguards of fundamental rights, and makes the immigrants 
subservient to political discretion57. 
53. S. 52 of the Charter as concerns the primacy of the 1982 Constitution Act. 
54. Douglas Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1988] W.W.R. 718. A collective 
agreement clause, approved by the government, stipulating mandatory retirement at age 
65, was judged discriminatory by s. 15 and s. 52 (1); W. BLACK and L. SMITH, supra, 
note 39, p. 676. 
55. Supra, note 11, p. 193 ; see also Drybones and Lavell, supra, note 49. 
56. Singh v. M.E.I., [1985] I S.C.R. 177 ; Y. D E MONTIGNY, supra, note 48, p. 567 ; H. BRUN 
and C. BRUNELLE , supra, note 8, p. 710. 
57. Supra, note 5;H. BRUN and C. BRUNELLE, supra, note 8, p. 709; J. H. GREY, supra, note 6, 
p. 7 ; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 459. 
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The troublesome distinction between rights and privileges was discussed 
in Singh by Wilson J. who recognized that while the appellants in the case 
were not yet entitled to assert rights of convention refugees, they were still 
entitled to fundamental justice in the determination of whether they were 
convention refugees or not. 
The creation of a dichotomy between privileges and rights played a significant 
role in narrowing the scope of the application of the Canadian Bill of Rights... I 
do not think this kind of analysis is acceptable in relation to the Charter... Given 
the potential consequences for the appellants of a denial ofthat status... it seems 
to me unthinkable that the Charter would not apply to entitle them to 
fundamental justice in the adjudication of their status.58 
This same reasoning has already been shown by the Supreme Court, 
regarding administrative law, in Martineau : 
There has been an unfortunate tendency to treat "rights" in the narrow sense of 
rights to which correlative legal duties attach. In this sense, "rights" are 
frequently contracted with "privileges" in the mistaken belief that only the 
former can ground judicial review of the decision-maker's actions. One should, 
I suggest, begin with the premise that any public body exercising power over 
subjects may be amenable to judicial supervision.59 
As put astutely by Professor Grey, because no untrammelled discretion 
is ever found, then every "privilege" necessarily implies a right to be considered 
and thus decisions about reviewability cannot depend on a distinction 
between rights and privileges but rather on the importance of the rights 
involved. In the case of basic rights guaranteed by the Charter, old distinctions 
and procedural refinements will give way to considering the merits and the 
consequences60. 
There is no longer any doubt today that the Charter can be invoked by 
not only Canadian citizens or permanent residents, but also by any person in 
Canada such as immigrants and refugees. Unless there is a clear intention by a 
constitutional section limiting the application of the Charter to Canadian 
citizens or permanent residents, all sections of the Charter can be invoked by 
aliens61. 
In the context of this study, paragraph 3(f) of the Immigration Act, 1976, 
as amended by Bill C-55 s. 262 expressly subjects the standards of admission 
58. Supra, note 56, p. 209-210 ; J.H. GREY, "Comment on Singh v. M.E.I.", (1986) 31 McGill L.J. 
496; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, "Notes on Singh v. M.E.I.", (1986) 64 R. du B. Can. 172. 
59. Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Bd., [1980] 1 SCR. 602, p. 618-619. 
60. J.H. GREY, supra, note 57, p. 504-506. 
61. Id. ; see also C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 58, p. 177; H. BRUN and C. BRUNELLE, supra, 
note 8, p. 709. 
62. Supra, note 32. 
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to the scrutiny of the Charter and particularly s. 15 and its test of discrimination. 
The range of application concerning "the law" poses no problem here, in as it 
is the legislation which is being contested, in particular, s. 8 and Schedule I of 
Immigration Regulations, 1978. However, administrative policy manuals 
will also be considered in the application of s. 15 because of their importance 
in guiding the administration of the immigration policy and practice63. 
Although it is established that all aliens in Canada have the right to 
invoke the guarantees of the Charter, it is not yet clear that the terms "every 
individual" also includes aliens outside of Canada. It may be suggested that 
the application of the Charter to aliens involved with immigration processes 
may vary with the physical location of the alien. Aliens who are physically 
present within Canada either legally or illegally, might be justifiably entitled 
to greater protection than those seeking admission to Canada at a port of 
entry or from outside of Canada. In other words, the alien may have to 
establish a close contact with the jurisdiction in order to rely on rights which 
are provided by the Charter64. 
The courts have already drawn such distinctions, as in the case of Dolack 
v. M.M.I.65 where the plaintiff, who was in an inadmissible class, sought a 
Minister's permit to facilitate his admission to Canada to participate in 
judicial proceedings. In dismissing the plaintiff's complaint of denial of 
process, equality before the law and a fair hearing, Justice Nitikman judged 
that the Canadian Bill of Rights applied only to persons living in Canada and 
not to a person living out of Canada66. However, if the same reasoning of 
Singh may be applied to the differentiation on the basis of location as it was 
applied to that of status, then it would be possible for aliens to invoke the 
guarantees of the Charter regardless of location67. 
1.2. The Notion of Discrimination : Defining the Undefinable 
This part of the study will examine the notion of discrimination and 
equality rights as defined by the traditional "similarly situated test" and as 
recently redefined in Andrews by the appropriate test of discrimination "on 
the enumerated or analogous grounds" of s. 15. Following the clarification of 
63. EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, Immigration Manual, updated to 26/01/90, 
available for public viewing at local Canadian Immigration Centres. 
64. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 464-465. 
65. [1983], 1 F.C. 194, 140 D.L.R. (3d) 767 (Fed. Court of appeal), 45 N.R. 146. 
66. F.N. MARROCO and H.M. GOSSETT, supra, note 36, p. 125; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, 
note 3, p. 465 ; see also J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 154. 
67. Supra, note 56. 
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the test of s. 15, these non-discriminatory standards will then be applied to the 
selection criteria for indépendant immigrants to assess its conformity to 
equality rights. 
1.2.1. Equality Rights and the Similarly Situated Test 
The formal notion of equality, in which "things that are alike should be 
treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in 
proportion to their unlikeness"68, has often been criticized as a tautology that 
is of no use in judging discrimination69. Professor Weston suggests this 
principle could only be of use if rules were established that would determine if 
two people were equal and if the treatment accorded to them was equal, 
because no two people are ever identical and the treatment accorded could be 
qualified indentical or different depending on the criteria chosen to make the 
comparison. The notion of equality is really a masquerade of the true nature 
of the analysis made, because it is really the rules dictating what constitutes a 
difference that permits the determination of the real meaning of the given 
rights70. 
The concept of equality is an elusive one and, as shown above, the formal 
notion of equality is insufficient by itself. Equality is, according to Mclntyre J. 
in Andrews, "a comparative concept, the condition of which may only be 
attained or discerned by comparison with the condition of others in the social 
and political setting in which the question arises"71. Therefore the real 
meaning of the notion of equality is not a question of logic but one of values 
and political choices. 
The traditional test based on the formal notion of equality "that similarly 
situated be similarly treated and conversely that persons who are differently 
situated be differently treated," has been widely accepted with some modifica-
tions in Canadian courts72. The test is, however, seriously deficient in that it 
68. Originally observed by ARISTOTLE, Politics, trans. John Warrington, London, Dent 
Everyman's Library, 1961, p. 134-135; see also K.H. FOOARTY, supra, note 51, p. 2-3; 
A.F. BAYEFSKY, "The Orientation of Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms", in 
J.M. Weiller and R.M. Elliot, eds., supra, note 42, p. 105. 
69. Id. ; W. BLACK and L. SMITH, supra, note 59, p. 628 ; D. PROULX, supra, note 39, p. 573-580 ; 
see also WS. TARNOPOLSKY, "The Equality Rights (s. 15,27, and 28)" in W.S. Tarnopolsky 
and G.A. Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary, 
Toronto, Carswell, 1982, p. 398. 
70. P. WESTON, "The Empty Idea of Equality", (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, p. 544-548. 
71. Supra,noit 11,p. 164;seealsoM. GOLD, "Moral and Political Theories in Equality Rights 
Adjudications", in J.M. Weiller and R.M. Elliot, eds., supra, note 42, p. 85 s. 
72. R. v. Ertel, (1987), 35 C.C.C. (3d) 398, p. 419 (Ont. CA.) ; Q. v. Century 21 Ramos Realty, 
(1987), 190 A.C. 25; Zutphen Brothers Construction Ltd. v. Dywidag Systems Interntl, 
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excludes any consideration of the nature of the law and so the mere equality 
of application to similarly situated groups or individuals does not offer a 
realistic test for a violation of equality rights73. 
S. 15 (1) of the Charter provides a much broader protection thant the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, in posing four basic rights of (1) equality before the 
law, (2) equality under the law, (3) equal protection of the law, and (4) equal 
benefit of the law. The inclusion of the last three additional rights was a clear 
attempt to remedy some of the shortcomings of the rights to equality under 
the Bill of Rights14. For this reason the equality guarantees in s. 15 (1) must 
be interpreted in their own context, which may involve entirely different 
considerations from comparable provisions in the Canadian Bill of Rights75. 
However, the definitions given for the Bill of Rights may be considered as the 
minimal content of the right to equality before the law found in s. 15 of the 
Charter76. 
In defining the scope of the four basic equality rights it is important to 
ensure that each right be given its full independent content divorced from any 
justificatory factors applicable under s. 1 of the Charter77. The existence of 
s. 1 and the demands it places on the State to justify limitations on rights is a 
distinctive feature of the Charter not found in the Canadian Bill of Rights™. 
Every difference in treatment between individuals under the law will not 
necessarily result in inequality and, as well, that identical treatment may 
Can. Ltd., (1987), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 433 (Nova Scotia S.C, Appeal Division). Reference Use 
of French in Criminal Proceeding in Saskatchewan, (1987), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 46 (C.A. 
Sask.);Ä. v. Bailey, (1986), 17C.R.R. 1 (Sup. Court of Yukon terr.); Reference re Family 
Benefits Act, (1986), 75 N.S.R. (2d), 338/351 (Nova Scotia S.C., Appeal Division) ; see also 
C F . BECKTON, "Section 15 and Section 1 of the Charter — The Courts Struggle", in 
G.A. Beaudoin, ed., supra, note 47, p. 282-286. 
73. As stated by Mclntyre J. in Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 166, "If it were to be applied 
literally, it could be used to justify the Nuremburg laws of Adolf Hitler. Similar treatment 
was contemplated for all Jews." 
74. For example : Bliss v. A. G. Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 188. It was judged under the Canadian 
Bill of Rights that no sexual discrimination existed against a woman denied unemployment 
benefits because of her pregnancy, for the reason that all people within the same category of 
pregnant persons were treated equally; C F . BECKTON, supra, note 72, p. 277-278. 
75. Turpin, supra, note 11, p. 1326 ; see also W. BLACK and L. SMITH, supra, note 39, p. 626 ; 
K.H. FOGARTY,supra,note 51, p. 89-134; A.F. BAYEFSKY,"DefiningEquality Rights", in 
A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts, eds., supra, note 9, p. 5-25. 
76. Turpin, supra, note 11, p. 1329. 
77. Id., p. 1326; see also A.F. BAYEFSKY, supra, note 75, p. 69-78; K.H. FOGARTY, supra, 
note 51, p. 89-99. 
78. Mclntyre J., Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 177; Turpin, supra, note 11, p. 1326; see also 
MacKay v. the Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370, p. 407. 
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frequently produce serious inequality. This same reasoning was expressed in 
Big M Drug Mart by the Supreme Court in the context of s. 2 (B) of the 
Charter. 
The equality necessary to support religious freedom does not require identical 
treatment of religions. In fact, the interests of true equality may well require 
differentiation in treatment.79 
The fact that identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality is 
recognized in s. 15 (2) which states that affirmative action programs are 
exempt from the effect of s. 15 (1)80. 
To approach the ideal of full equality before and under the law, the main 
consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or group 
concerned. As stated in Andrews by Mclntyre J., 
The ideal should be that a law expressed to bind all, should not because of 
irrelevant personal differences have a more burdensome or less beneficial 
impact on one than another.8I 
In considering the similar judicial reasoning of the Supreme Court on the 
Ontario Human Rights Code*2 and in Big M Drug Mart%l, s. 15 should be 
applicable in discrimination that is either intentional or non-intentional. 
The purpose of s. 15 is to ensure equality in the formulation and 
application of the law. However the promotion of equality has a much more 
specific goal than the mere elimination of distinctions. Once it has been 
determined that a distinction created by the impugned legislation results in a 
violation of one of the equality rights, it must be judged whether the 
distinction is discriminatory in its purpose or effect84. 
1.2.2. Based on the Enumerated or Analogous Grounds of s. 15 
In Andrews and Turpin the Supreme Court of Canada anchored the 
s. 15 analysis in the concept of "discrimination. " The internal qualification in 
s. 15 that the differential treatment be "without discrimination" is determinative 
of whether or not there has been a violation of this section. It is only when one 
79. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, p. 347. 
80. W. BLACK and L. SMITH, supra, note 39, p. 666-668. 
81. Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 165. 
82. Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; see also Re 
Blainey, supra, note 50. 
83. Supra, note 79. 
84. Mclntyre J., Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 182 ; Turpin, supra, note 11, p. 1334. 
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of the four equality rights has been denied with discrimination that a 
complaint under s. 15 could be sustained85. 
After examining the jurisprudence on discrimination developed under 
the Human Rights Codes*6, Mclntyre J. in Andrews offered the following 
definition of discrimination : 
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether 
intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of 
the individual or group which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or 
disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which 
withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits and advantages available to 
other members of society.87 
In determining whether there is discrimination on grounds relating to 
personal characteristics of the individual or group, Wilson J. states in Turpin 
that 
it is important to look not only at the impugned legislation which has created a 
distinction that violates the right to equality but also to the larger social, 
political and legal context... A finding that there is discrimination will in most 
but perhaps not all cases, necessarily entail a search for disadvantage that exists 
apart from and independent of the particular legal distinction being challenged.88 
In short, the immediate or related, as well as intentional or non-intentional 
consequences of the law will be submitted to the test of discrimination in s. 15. 
In recognizing that the enumerated and analogous grounds approach 
most closely accords with the purposes of s. 15 and the definition of discrimi-
nation given by Mclntyre J., the criteria of a discrete and insular minority 
was also considered89. The determination of whether a group falls into an 
analogous category to those enumerated in s. 15 should not be made only in 
the context of the impugned law but rather in the context of the place of the 
group in the entire social, political and legal fabric of Canadian society90. 
These analogous grounds should be interpreted in a broad and generous 
85. Mclntyre J., Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 182; Turpin, supra, note 11, p. 1331 ; see also 
A.F. BAYEFSKY, supra, note 75, p. 3-32; C F . BECKTON, supra, note 72, p. 278. 
86. Simpson Sears Ltd., supra, note 82; C.N. Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human 
Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 ; Bhinder v. C.N. Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
561. 
87. Supra, note 11, p. 174; reaffirmed in Turpin, supra, note II, p. 1331. 
88. Supra, note 11, p. 1331-1332; see also A.F. BAYEFSKY, supra, note 75, p. 32-38 ;W. BLACK 
and L. SMITH, supra, note 39, p. 641. 
89. Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 183 ; Turpin, supra, note 11, p. 1332 ; see also C F . BECKTON, 
supra, note 72, p. 279-280. 
90. Wilson J., Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 152. 
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manner, reflecting the fact that they are constitutional provisions not easily 
appealed or amended91. 
The limits if any on the grounds of discrimination await definition in 
future cases. However, the search for stereotyping, historical disadvantage, 
or vulnerability to political and social prejudice would serve as an indicator of 
discrimination92. Mclntyre J. was of the view that distinctions based on 
personal characteristics would almost certainly be discriminatory, while 
distinctions based on an individual's merits or capacities, almost always fell 
outside the concept of discrimination93. La Forest J. refined this viewpoint 
by classifying as analogous distinctions based on personal aspects not within 
the control of the individual, and in this sense, immutable, or not alterable by 
conscious action and in some cases not alterable except on the basis of 
unacceptable costs94. 
In the Charter, while s. 15 (1), subject always to subs. (2), expresses its 
prohibition of discrimination in absolute terms, s. 1 makes allowance for a 
reasonable limit upon the operation of s. 15 (1). This is a distinct step called 
for under the Charter which is not found in most Human Rights Acts, 
because in these Acts justification for or defence to discrimination is generally 
found in specific exceptions to the substantive rights, nor in the Canadian Bill 
of Rights as mentioned before95. In describing the analytical approach to the 
Charter in Oakes96 and Edwards Books and Arts Ltd.97, the essential feature 
was that the right guaranteeing sections be kept analytically separate from 
s. 1. Thus once discrimination is found under s. 15 it must be justified under 
the broad provisions of s. 1 of the Charter. 
1.2.3. Selection Criteria : Discretionary or Discriminatory? 
The independent immigrant is the third class of immigrants, the other 
two being the family class and Convention refugees, and it includes all 
immigrants who apply on their own initiative for admission into Canada, 
such as assisted relatives, retirees, entrepreneurs, investors, self-employed 
91. Mclntyre J., Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 175; Turpin, supra, note 11, p. 1332; see also 
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, p. 155 ; Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 9. 
92. Turpin, supra, note 11, p. 1333. 
93. Andrews, supra, note II, p. 174-175. 
94. Id., p. 195. 
95. Mclntyre J., Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 177; see also C F . BECKTON, supra, note 72, 
p. 288-290. 
96. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
97. R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713. 
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persons, etc.98. Except for retirees, all immigrants in this class are assessed 
against the factors in the selection criteria. However, not every independent 
applicant is assessed against all the selection criteria. Applicants are rated 
only according to those factors which actually affect their ability to become 
successfully established in Canada". In the case of Quebec, there is an 
agreement which provides for Canada and Quebec to participate jointly and 
equally in the selection according to criteria established by each party. The 
landing of an independent immigrant in Quebec requires Quebec's prior 
agreement 10°. 
In general, the selection criteria established in Schedule I of the Immigration 
Regulations, 1978, provide the visa officer with an independent assessment 
structure for appraisal of the qualities and skills of prospective immigrants in 
order to determine their acceptability for permanent residence. The format is 
arranged into 100 available assessment points and is reflective of the qualities 
which are supposed to exemplify a qualified and capable immigrant. The 
criteria's composition and weighing are designed to meet Canada's demographic 
and labour market needs and thus emphasis is placed on the practical 
training, experience, education, and capability of the applicantl01. 
The selection criteria evaluation format is very similar to the process an 
individual must undertake when applying for employment. It represents an 
outwardly non-discriminatory and practical approach to determining a 
person's suitability as a prospective immigrant. Biased towards skilled 
workers and professionals of lower age, it forms the centre of an aggressive 
immigration policy to meet some of Canada's skilled worker needs for the 
future, and specific criteria are adjusted as conditions warrant102. However, a 
key feature of the policy is that it is clearly based on the premise of 
"Canadians first" m. 
98. S. 6 of Immigration Act, 1976 concerning selection of immigrants ; Canada's Immigration 
Law, supra, note 31, p. 6-11 ; Immigration Manual, I.S. 4 independent immigrants, supra, 
note 63; see also F.N. MARROCO and H.M. GOSSETT, eds., supra, note 36, p. 320-326; 
C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 110-112. 
99. Id. 
100. Canada-Quebec Agreement on Immigration, 20/02/78, by virtue of s. 108, Immigration 
Act, 1976 concerning consultation and agreements with provinces; see also J.H. GREY, 
supra, note 6, p. 9-10. 
101. S. 114 (1) of Immigration Act, 1976, concerning regulatory powers of the Governor in 
Council ; supra, note 98. 
102. Immigration Manual, I.S. 4.01-4.03, supra, note 63 ; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, 
p. 111 ; see also J. JEAN, Statut judirique de l'immigrant au Canada, Mémoire de maîtrise, 
Université Laval, 1984, p. 28. 
103. Item 5, the factor of arranged or designated employment, of Schedule I, supra, note 10, 
assures minimal impact on employment opportunities for Canadians; see also 
C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 113. 
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Canada's history of ethnie discrimination, inflicted in part through 
immigration laws, has its remnants in the present regime 104. Although the 
Immigration Act of 1976 is "colour blind" in appearance, a variety of 
regulations remain overtly discriminatory and leaked documents indicate 
that policies are often applied in a discriminatory manner against specified 
ethnic and national groups105. Certain categories in the selection criteria are 
dependent on a discretionay evaluation by the visa officer and appear prima 
facie, discriminatory in the sense of s. 15 of the Charter. Even in the more 
objective categories, the visa officer has the discretion to refuse or approve an 
application notwithstanding the assessed unit total, if in his opinion, it does 
not reflect the chances of the applicant becoming successfully established in 
Canada106. 
This study will now examine several of the factors considered by the 
selection criteria and assess their conformity to equality rights in s. 15. 
1.2.3.1. How Old is "Old Enough"? 
Item 7 of the selection criteria evaluates the applicants according to their 
age, awarding the maximum of 10 points if they are at least 21 and not more 
than 44 years old, and subtracting two points for each full year that they 
exceed or fall short of the set age limits. However, in order to discover if s. 15 
of the Charter may be invoked, it must be determined, (1) whether the 
distinction of age created by s. 8 and Schedule I results in a violation of one of 
the equality rights and, if so, (2) whether that distinction is discriminatory in 
its purpose or effect. 
As stated before, to approach the idea of full equality before and under 
the law, the main consideration must be the impact of the law on the 
individual or group concerned. In applying the "similarly situated" testl07, it 
is found that there are distinctions made between the same class of independent 
immigrants solely on the basis of their age. The effect of this distinction is 
such that those who are within the set age limits receive preferential treatment 
while those who are outside of the limits are penalized and risk falling short of 
the required point total for admission. 
104. R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 121 ; see the introduction of this study. 
105. Lodge v. M.El, [1979] 1 F.C. 775, 25 N.R. 437, 94 D.L.R. (3d) 326 (Fed. CA.) ; 
A.F. BAYEFSKY, "The Jamaican Women Case and the Canadian Human Rights Act: Is 
Government Subject to the Principle of Equal Opportunity?" (1980), 18 U. W.O.L. Rev., 
46. 
106. S. 11 (3) of Immigration Regulations, 1978; see also J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 30. 
107. See part 1.2.1. of this study. 
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The guarantee of equality before the law, as stated by Wilson J. in 
Turpin, 
is designed to advance the value that all persons be subject to the equal demands 
and burdens of the law and not suffer any greater disability in the substance and 
application of the law than others. This value has historically been associated 
with the requirements of the rule of law that all persons be subject to the law 
impartially applied and administered.108 
Therefore, the differentiation in ages between the independent immigrants is 
held to have violated the principle of equality before that law. 
The second part of the test of discrimination is easily accomplished as the 
distinction of age is an enumerated category of s. 15 109. Age is clearly a 
personal characteristic of an individual and not a merit or capacity. In the 
unamended version of s. 3(f) of the Immigration Act of 1976, the guarantee of 
non-discrimination on the grounds of age was omitted. Perhaps this is an 
implicit admission that age discrimination was considered a legitimate practice 
in immigration policy. Thus, Item 7 of s. 8 of the Regulations, 1978 is judged 
to be discriminatory in its intent and effect, violating s. 15 of the Charter and 
paragraph 3(f) of the Immigration Act, 1976 as amended by Bill C-55, s. 2 
subjecting itself to the equality guarantees of the Charter "°. 
The recent jurisprudence of discrimination based on age has reaffirmed 
this principle of a discrimination prima facie for the enumerated grounds of 
s. 15 (1) ' " . As stated by Mclntyre J. in Andrews, 
The enumerated grounds do, however, reflect the most common and probably 
the most usually destructive and historically practiced bases of discrimination 
and must, in the words of s. 15 (1), receive particular attention. " 2 
1.2.3.2. Personal Suitability from a Personal Viewpoint? 
In Item 9 determination of the number of points to be awarded to an 
applicant, to a maximum of 10, depends on the interviewing officer's 
judgement of the applicant's personal suitability. The qualities of adaptability, 
108. Supra, note 11, p. 1329. 
109. See part 1.2.2. of this study; see also M.E. ATCHESON and L. SULLIVAN, "Passage to 
Retirement : Age Discrimination and the Charter", in A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts, eds., 
supra, note 9, p. 272-277. 
110. Supra, note 32. 
111. Harrison v. University of B.C., [1988], 2 W.W.R. 688 (B.C. C. of A.); McKinney v. 
University of Guelph, (1988), 63 O.R. (2d) 1 ; Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, 
[1988], 2 W.W.R. 708 (B.C. C. of A.), AU three judgements ruled that a stipulation of 
obligatory retirement at age 65 years old was discriminatory according to s. 15 of the 
Charter. 
112. Supra, note 11, p. 175. 
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motivation, initiative, resourcefulness and other similar attributes, admirable 
or otherwise, are characteristics on which the officer may base his judgement. 
In addition, such characteristics on the part of the applicant's dependents 
may also influence the assessment "3 . 
In applying the test of discrimination in s. 15 to the personal suitability 
factor, the assessment made on the basis of this criterion must first have an 
effect which differentiates the treatment accorded to an individual or group 
from the treatment accorded to a similarly situated individual or group. The 
subjects of comparison, as in all of the cases dealing with the selection criteria, 
are the indépendant immigrant class with the distinctions being based on the 
qualities afore-mentioned. The disadvantages imposed by the law on those 
immigrants judged lacking in the valued qualities, are the loss of assessment 
points and risk of refused admission because of an insufficient point total. 
Given that the principle of equality before the law has been violated, the 
discriminatory nature of the distinction must now be proven. The key to this 
determination is the qualification of the desired attributes in Item 9. In 
applying the test posed in Andrews, on distinctions based on personal 
characteristics and merits, each attribute must be examined to see if it is of a 
discriminatory nature '14. The words "motivation, initiative, and resourcefulness" 
may be classified arguably as merits in the sense that they are alterable by 
conscious action and can be controlled by the individual. However, the term 
"adaptability" presents certain difficulties as to its meaning. 
The word "adaptability" is defined in common terms as the ability to 
adjust or fit oneself to new surroundings "5. In referring to the Immigration 
Manual I.S. 4.08 concerning factors of selection and its appendix A, the 
meaning of this term is unexplained. Therefore, it must be presumed that the 
meaning given to adaptability is that of its everyday use. However, in order to 
judge one's adaptability, it seems essential that certain immutable personal 
characteristics such as ethnic origin, religion, or age have to be considered in 
this evaluation. The essence of the ability to adapt itself implies a certain 
intimate aspect of a person. This interpretation is supported by s. 3 (b) of 
Immigration Act of 1976 which links Item 9 to the objective to enrich and 
strengthen the cultural and social fabric of Canada "6 . 
It may be argued that the term "adaptability", read in conjunction with 
the other attributes mentioned in Item 9, should thus be interpreted in a more 
neutral, non-discriminatory sense and considered moreover as a merit. By 
113. Supra, note 10; Immigration Manual, I.S. 4.08, supra, note 63. 
114. See part 1.2.2. of this study. 
115. J.B. Sykes, ed., The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982. 
116. Canada's Immigration Law, supra, note 31, p. 46-47. 
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recalling the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the determination of 
discrimination, it is important to also examine Item 9 in the larger social, 
political and legal context117. The attributes enumerated in Item 9 are all 
subjective ones and thus depend entirely on the discretion of the judging visa 
officer. The standards upon which this officer must judge the attributes by are 
presumably those of a Canadian citizen. However, different individuals from 
different ethnic or religious groups may judge these same qualities by 
different standards inherent to their particular culture or religion 'l8. Therefore, 
by considering the larger social context of Item 9, the discriminatory nature 
of the evaluation itself and its unintentional effects becomes evident "9 . 
This wide interpretation of the personal suitability factor conforms with 
the spirit of s. 15 and its objectives to prevent cultural or religious discrimination. 
Thus the attributes enumerated in Item 9 may be declared prima facie 
discriminatory, as related to grounds enumerated in s. 15 of the Charter or 
even as an analogous category120. 
1.2.3.3. Discrimination and the Colour of Money 
The aim of this part of the study will be to test Item 4 as well as Items 2 
and 3, as they are interrelated to the occupational factor, for a differentiation 
in treatment accorded to independent immigrants and if this differentiation is 
discriminatory in the sense of s. 15. 
The occupation factor of Item 4 is evaluated according to the employment 
opportunities available in Canada in the occupation that the applicant is 
qualified for and is prepared to follow in Canada. An occupation list, in 
Appendix B, specifies a variety of occupations with a point value of between 0 
and 10 assigned to each occupation. Points will be awarded to a maximum of 
10 and 0 points will be a bar to further processing unless the applicant has a 
validated offer of employment. Finally, the list is reviewed on an ongoing 
basis by the Commission to determine if any changes should be made in 
consideration of the current labour market or for immigration management 
reasons m . 
117. See part 1.2.2. of this study. 
118. For example, the terme "initiative"for an Oriental immigrant may not have the same socio-
cultural connotation as for a Canadian visa officer, because of how "initiative" is defined 
and viewed according to Oriental customs and values. 
119. R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 110-116; see also part 1.2.2. of this study; W.BLACK, 
"Religion and the Right of Equality", in A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts, eds., supra, note 9, 
p. 140-151. 
120. Id. 
121. Immigration Manual, I.S. 4.08, supra, note 63 ; see also EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION 
CANADA, Future Immigration Levels — 1988 Consultation Issues, Ottawa, Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada, 1988, p. 18-19; CJ. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 113. 
500 Les Cahiers de Droit (1990) 3lC.de D. 477 
The specific vocational preparation (S.V.P.) factor of Item 2 is used to 
assign a point equivalent to the formal training required for average performance 
in the occupation in which an applicant is assessed in Item 4. The S.V.P. value 
of the occupation is found in the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of 
Occupations ni and converted to the appropriate amount of points, to a 
maximum of 15, by using the conversion table in Item 2123. 
For the experience factor in Item 3, points are awarded for experience in 
the occupation in which the applicant is assessed under Item 4. A maximum 
of 8 points is available with 0 points being a bar to further processing unless, 
the applicant has arranged employment in Canada, a written statement from 
the proposed employer certifying his hiring of the unexperienced applicant, 
and the consent of the visa officer as detailed in s. 11 (1) of Immigration 
Regulations, 1978. There is also a direct correlation between the points 
awarded and the S.V.P. time required for the occupation as shown in the 
table of Item 3 l24. 
In Item 4 a distinction is made between independent immigrants based 
on the kind of occupation the applicant is qualified for, disadvantaging those 
whose occupations are less valued according to the occupational list125. As 
has been noted with the factors of age and personal suitability, this loss of 
points may lead to the risk of inadmission for lack of a sufficient point total or 
even immediate disqualification if the applicant cannot meet the conditions 
of s. 11 (2) of Immigration Regulations, 1978126. The same analysis may be 
made resulting in this violation of the principle of equality before the law, for 
Items 2 and 3 with experience or S.V.P. time being used as the basis of 
differential treatment. 
As was with the factor of personal suitability, the determination of 
whether these differential treatments are discriminatory or not, in the sense of 
s. 15 of the Charter, will depend on the qualification of the nature of these 
distinctions. The analysis of the occupational factor in Item 4 will be equally 
valid for the experience and S.V.P. factors in Items 3 and 2, because of their 
intrinsic dependency on the former ni. Once again, the case of Andrews 
122. Available from Chief Occupational and Career Information Operations, Employment 
Operational Services, Employment and Immigration Canada, Ottawa. 
123. Supra, note 121. 
124. Id. 
125. The special admission procedures applicable to certain professions in Immigration Manual, 
I.S. 4.32, supra, note 63, do not affect the validity of these limitations and thus, will not be 
considered in this analysis. 
126. Supra, note 121. 
127. Immigration Manual, I.S. 4.08, supra, note 63 ; Items 2 and 3 depend on the consideration 
of the occupational factor as the basis for their own individual assessments. 
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asserted invaluable guidelines by its qualification of personal characteristics 
as discriminatory and personel merits as non-discriminatory, with the rare 
possibility of exceptions to these classifications128. 
The occupation of an individual is a personal aspect that is for most cases 
"unalterable except on the basis of unacceptable costs and in some cases, 
unalterable by conscious actions"129. Among those occupations which are 
excluded from the list, are physicians, surgeons, lawyers, or supervisors. 
These occupations require a great deal of sacrifice on the part of the 
individuals to have attained their present employment status. In being forced 
to abandon their chosen occupations to avoid possible exclusion and to have 
to relearn a new career, the first criterion of unacceptable costs is clearly 
satisfied. 
It may even be argued that for some, if not most individuals, their choice 
of occupation is unalterable by conscious action because of the great importance 
of the role it plays in their lives. Changing occupations is often not only an 
economic choice but also a psychological one involving the consideration of 
many social factors that are themselves immutable. Although not applicable 
to aliens, s. 6 (2b) of the Charter indicates the importance of the right to a 
livelihood, and its consideration as a constitutional guarantee130. The recent 
ruling in Irwin Toy by the Supreme Court on economic rights does not 
detract from this analysis because only the economic rights encompassed by 
the term "property" are not protected by s. 7 of the Charter while those 
economic rights fundamental to human life or survival were distinguished 
from the former and left unpronounced on by the Court131. In any case, the 
analyses made in s. 7 are not binding here, because the guarantees of equality 
rights are the exclusive domain of s. 15 132. 
In pursuing this analysis, the search for stereotyping, historical disad-
vantages or vulnerability to political or social prejudices could serve as a 
useful indicator of discrimination133. The Green Paper134, upon which the 
128. See part 1.2.2. of this study. 
129. La Forest J., Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 195. 
130. The objective of s. 6 (2b) of the Charter, as affirmed in Law Society of Upper Canada v. 
Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, and Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591, is 
the elimination of provincial barriers to the right of a livelihood. In this sense, the freedom 
to work where one pleases is protected ; see also P. BLACHE, "Liberté de circulation et 
d'établissements de résidence", in G.A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushny, eds., supra, note 39, 
p. 362-363. 
131. Supra, note 43, p. 1003. 
132. R. v. Cornell, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 461. 
133. See part I.2.2. of this study. 
134. Supra, note 28. 
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present Immigration Act is based upon, was characterized by many groups as 
a thinly-veiled racist document. Rather than examining the real root causes of 
Canada's social and economic difficulties in the 1970's, it was charged that 
the Green Paper used immigrant groups, being one of the least politically 
powerful groups in society, as convenient scapegoats. Continued restrictions 
in the immigration field were alleged to be economically based, simply to 
conceal the true social and domestic considerations l35. Whatever the true 
implications of the analysis in the Green Paper, the new legislation, in line 
with its format, was increasingly restricted and labour-oriented 136. 
Considering this context, this study submits that the occupational factor 
of Item 4, and consequently Items 2 and 3, is discriminatory in its indirect 
effects on immigrants from nations whose choice or access to these occupations 
"valued" by Canada's immigration criteria are limited, due to the social 
economic and political conditions in these nations. It matters not that these 
discriminatory effects are intentional or not, the fact remains that the 
distinctions made in Item 4 are personal aspects not within the control of the 
individual and thus violate the equality rights of s. 15 l37. 
The broad and generous interpretation of analogous grounds of discrim-
ination in s. 15, encouraged by the Supreme Court in Andrews, helps in 
justifying this analysis. Unlike the case of Turpin, this analysis does not 
"overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question," nor is it 
stretching the imagination "to characterize immigrants who are forcibly 
disadvantaged by their livelihood, as members of "a discrete and insular 
minority"138. The purposes of s. 15 in remedying or preventing discrimination 
against groups suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in Canadian 
society are advanced here, as immigrants' equality rights are shielded from 
the omnipresence of administrative discretion in immigration law and policy. 
2. The Selection Criteria and Reasonable Limits of Equality Rights 
2.1. Multiculturalism and Equality Rights 
27. [Multiculturalism heritage] This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage 
of Canadians. 
135. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 64-65 ; see also LONEY and MOSCOVITCH, "The Immi-
gration Green Paper in Black and White", (1975), 10 Can. Dimensions, p. 4. 
136. Id. ; H.G. HOWITH, supra, note 29. 
137. See part 1.2.2. of this study. 
138. Turpin, supra, note 11, p. 1333 ; Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 79, p. 344. 
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S. 27 of the Charter which states that the interpretation of the Charter 
must conform with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural 
heritage of Canadians, may also be of use in the interpretation of equality 
rights. The following analysis will focus on the concept of multiculturalism in 
s. 27, its correlation with equality rights in s. 15, and its influence on 
immigration law. 
2.1.1. The Scope of Multiculturalism 
Constitutional interpretation of s. 27 by the courts as well as attempts by 
Canadian courts to interpret the Charter in a manner to preserve and enhance 
multiculturalism have yet to result in the formulation of a coherent theory for 
s. 27 139. The wording itself of s. 27 does not recognize an apparent significance 
of the multiculturalism principle nor does an examination of its constitutional 
sources provide a uniform manner of its application by the courts140. The 
difficulties of interpreting s. 27 arise from the very fact that the section itself is 
a principle of interpretation141. 
In order to remedy its doctrinal and legislative ambiguity, the coherent 
application of s. 27 will necessitate the elaboration of intermediate principles 
that will help to clarify the usefulness and sense of the section. There are, 
however, three minimal conditions that each principle must satisfy in order is 
be considered an applicable judicial principle for s. 27. First, a coherent 
intermediate principle must be able to reconcile or balance the interests of the 
majority and those of the minority groups. Second, any principle of multicul-
turalism implies that a great importance is attached to the autonomy and 
diversity of minorities, within reasonable limits. Finally, the principle of 
multiculturalism must be useful in analysis or understanding as a tool for 
jurists and other practitioners l42. 
139. J.E. MAGNET, "Multiculturalisme et droits collectifs vers une interprétation de l'article 27", 
in G.A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushny, supra, note 39, p. 832. 
140. Big M Drug Marl, supra, note 79 ; Edwards Books, supra, note 97 ; in these two cases the 
reasoning in the application of s. 27 of the Charter, differed greatly from ajudgement based 
on religious grounds in the former and one based on secular grounds in the latter ; see also 
Q. v. Videoflicks, (1984) 5 O.A.C. 1, for an analysis of the link between s. 27 and the 
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. 
G.A.O.R., supp. (No. 16), 52 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
141. M. LEBEL, "Quelques réflexion autour de l'article 27 de la Charte canadienne des droits", in 
Canadian Human Rights Foundation, Multiculturalism and the Charter : A Legal Perspective, 
Toronto, Carswell, 1987, p. 139; see also D. GIBSON, The Law of the Charter — General 
Principles, Toronto, Carswell, 1986, p. 67-69 ; W.S. TARNOPOLSKY, supra, note 69, p. 441. 
142. J.E. MAGNET, supra, note 139, p. 836-838. 
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The following three intermediate principles are all pertinent and should 
be considered when interpreting the Charter : the ethnic symbolism, structural 
ethnicity and non-discrimination143. 
Ethnic symbolism is a psychological concept in which the cultural 
heritage is defined as a voluntary identification of the individual to the 
traditions and history of a given ethnic group. Therefore, an attack on the 
cultural heritage of an individual will also constitute an attack affecting all 
members of the group. As an intermediate principle, ethnic symbolism will 
guide the courts in their understanding of this personal aspect each time they 
interpret the Charter. At the very least the courts will have to recognize the 
particular importance of the needs of a group to develop the essential traits of 
their personality and to express them in forms that may be internalized in 
individualsl44. 
Structural ethnicity is defined as the capacity of a collectivity to perpetuate, 
to compensate for its losses, to resist assimilation and to propagate its beliefs 
and practices. This form of ethnic membership is not an individual choice but 
rather the creation of an institutional infrastructure by a group or the 
government, to promote the welfare and justify the continuation of its 
existence. This principle implies that the courts must recognize the certain 
autonomy of the cultural communities in their management of this infrastruc-
ture. In short, this principle allows for the further legitimization of collective 
rights in Canada for cultural minorities l45. 
The intermediate principle of non-discrimination is essentially based on 
equality rights and as such shall be discussed in the following part of the 
study. 
2.1.2. Non-discrimination as an Intermediate Principle 
The guarantee of equality in s. 15 of the Charter underlies the existence 
of a principle of non-discrimination that is very efficient but if too strictly 
interpreted, applies only to individuals. Application of s. 27 to the principle 
of non-discrimination in s. 15 helps to enlarge the interpretation of equality 
rights so that groups may also be protected by the Charter. As for the 
interpretation of other Charter guarantees, s. 27 contains its own intermediate 
principle of non-discrimination that applies to groups when they invoke the 
protection of their Charter rights146. 
143. id. 
144. Id., p. 840-841. 
145. Id, p. 842-865. 
146. C F . BECKTON, "Section 27 and Section 15 of the Charter", in Canadian Human Rights 
Foundation, supra, note 141, p. 1-3 ; see also W.S. TARNOPOLSKY, supra, note 69, p. 442 ; 
R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 112. 
w. CHI YAN TOM Immigration et droit à l'égalité 505 
Every judicial system that intends to preserve and promote the charac-
teristics of a group of persons must recognize the importance of the principle 
of non-discrimination. Indeed, discrimination is the most serious problem 
facing the preservation of a distinct cultural identity, because if the sacrifices 
to maintain this cultural distinctiveness are too great, then assimilation will 
become more desired by the individuals of the ethnic minorities into the 
predominant cultural majority. It is for this reason that the concept of non-
discrimination is so essential to the understanding and the application of 
s. 27 147. 
Ethnic cultural minorities have much in common with the order groups 
that compose the Canadian political system, but in the preservation and 
development of their ethnic cultures, they have their own political objectives. 
If discrimination hinders the access of these minorities to the political system, 
or prevents their essential interaction with the dominant groups, the ethnic 
minority will lose its capacity for self-development. It is for this second reason 
that the principle of non-discrimination must be maintained to preserve and 
enhance the particular traits that are characteristic of cultural groups in 
Canada '« . 
The principle of non-discrimination is based not on the idea of multicul-
turalism but on equality and it is in this perspective that its limits become 
apparent. From a formal viewpoint of equality, where those similarly situated 
should be similarly treated, the argument is that advantages should not be 
accorded to one group without according them, and to the detriment of other 
groups l49. However, as discussed before, the inadequacies of the "similarly 
situated" test are evident and in order to appreciate the full meaning of the 
equality guarantee in s. 15, the larger political, social and legal context must 
also be considered. The key in the "similarly situated" test is to see which two 
categories of groups are to be chosen for comparison, and to do so, the rules 
for choosing these categories may be found in the generous and conscientious 
interpretation of s. 15 15°. 
Thus the objectives of s. 27 necessitate the adoption of special measures 
in order to protect our multicultural heritage from the forces of assimilation, 
and thus, lead to the notion of equality that authorizes differences in 
treatment, to arrive at an equality by indirect results 151. 
147. Id. 
148. M. LEBEL, supra, note 141, p. 143 ; R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 124 ; J.E. MAGNET, supra, 
note 1399, p. 839. 
149. C F . BECKTON, supra, note 146, p. 12-13; J.E. MAGNET, supra, note 139, p. 839. 
150. Id. ; M. LEBEL, supra, note 141, p. 144. 
151. Id.; for example, in Bhinder, supra, note 86, the Supreme Court made it clear that the 
Canadian Human Rights Act, 25-26 Elizabeth II, Ch. 33,1977, extends to both intentional 
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2.1.3. Multiculturalism and Immigration Law 
The importance of the principle of multiculturalism to immigration law 
is evidenced by the presence of s. 3 (b) of the Immigration Act, 1976, 
emphasizing the cultural and social objectives of present immigration policy152. 
Thus, s. 27 of the Charter should be considered when applying other Charter 
rights to Canadian immigration law. The equality rights in s. 15 of the 
Charter and reaffirmed in s. 3 (f) of the Immigration Act of 1976 as recently 
amended, guarantee the principle of non-discrimination that is so essential in 
the preservation and enhancement of Canada's multicultural heritage. 
The early legislative history of Canada's immigration law was characterized 
by overt and blatant ethnic discrimination, as discussed earlier in this study. 
Later on with the reforms brought on by an increasing emphasis on economic 
objectives and the institution of the points system, Canadian immigration law 
became in its appearance non-discriminatoryl53. However, as discussed at 
length in this study, the present immigration law is still deficient in its 
conformity to equality rights in s. 15. Not only is the principle of non-
discrimination prominent in the application of immigrant law, but those of 
ethnic symbolism and structural ethnicity should also be considered in the 
interpretation of equality rights in the multicultural context, and, as well their 
reasonable limits 154. 
With Canada's declining birthrate, there will be a greater need for 
immigrants in order to compensate for the resulting decline in the Canadian 
work force and to support the country's social programs. Canadians with 
European roots have little option but to adapt to a society increasingly fed by 
newcomers from other continents. The reality confronting Canada is clear, 
for the ethnic mosaic will increasingly be set in colours other than whitel55. 
The role of the legislator will be to contain any backlash against visible 
minorities by promoting the value of multiculturalism and the need for new 
immigrants from these minorities156. In 1988, Parliament passed the new 
and non-intentional, or adverse impact discrimination, in deciding a claim involving 
religious discrimination. 
152. Canada's Immigration Law, supra, note 31, p 46-47; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, 
p. 72; see also G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 12-13. 
153. See introduction of this study. 
154. S. 27 and s. 1 of the Charter respectively. 
155. P. KoPViiXEN and others, "An Angry racial Backlash", 10/07/89, Maclean's, p. 14, 16; 
G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 6-7; V. MALAREK, "Canada to remain 
favored target for immigrants, study predicts", 4/01/90, The Globe and Mail. 
156. Id., D. STOFFMAN, "Asia comes to Lotusland", 11/89, The Globe and Mail — Report on 
Business Magazine, p. 124, 124. 
W. CHI YAN TOM Immigration et droit à l'égalité 507 
Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 35-36-37, c. 31, 1988, that enshrined in law, 
"the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve and share their 
cultural heritages." Legislation now before Parliament would create a separate 
and more powerful department of multiculturalism and citizenship. However, 
with the disturbingly discriminatory philosophy in current immigration 
policy, these measures will be ineffectual and simply superficial unless the 
necessary changes are instituted in the immigrant selection criteria and 
system as a whole. S. 27 should be considered as an active agent in the 
promotion of multicultural rights and has, at the very least, an interpretative 
value in the implementation of equality rights in immigration law. 
2.2. Discrimination and the Test of Justification 
1. [Rights and freedoms in Canada] The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. 
The test of justification is to be applied only when there has been found a 
violation of a fundamental right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter. In 
keeping the analysis of reasonable limits separate from the test of discrimination 
in s. 15, the impugned immigration legislation must now be justified according 
to the following criteria in s. 1 of the Charter, and as interpreted in the recent 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. Keeping in mind the limits of 
this study, an indepth analysis of these questions will not be possible at this 
stage. However, this study will provide an overview of the problems at hand. 
2.2.1. Pressing and Substantial Objectives 
In order to apply the test of justification in s. 1, a limitation on a Charter 
right must be "prescribed by law"157. In the recent case of Thomsen, the 
Supreme Court concluded that a limit is 
... prescribed by law within the meaning of s. 1 if it is expressly provided for by 
statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication from the terms of a 
statute or regulation or from its operating requirement. Therefore, a reasonable 
limit need not be spelled out in legislation but is sufficient if its regulators set out 
the limitations.I58 
157. Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 980-981 ; see also Q. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613; 
A.F. BAYEFSKY, supra, note 75, p. 73 ; D. GIBSON, supra, note 141, p. 152-155 ; ONTARIO 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Sources for the Interpretation of Equality Rights Under the Charter 
— A Background Paper, Toronto, 1985, p. 182-184. 
158. R. v. Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, p. 650-651 ; reaffirmed in Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, 
p. 981 and Wilson J., Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 153-154. 
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Limits within s. 1 must also be sufficiently precise to be reasonable 159. In 
Irwin Toy, the Court held that 
Absolute precision in the law exists rarely if at all. The question is whether the 
legislature has provided an intelligible standard according to which the judiciary 
must do its work. The task of interpreting how that standard applies in 
particular instances might always be characterized as having a discretionary 
element, because the standard can never specify all the instances in which it 
applies. On the other hand, where there is no intelligible standard and where the 
legislature has given a plenary discretion to do whatever seems best in a wide set 
of circumstances, there is no "limit prescribed by law.",60 
It is now well established that the onus of justifying the limitation of a 
right or freedom rests with the party seeking to uphold the limitation, and the 
analysis to be conducted is that set forth by Dickson C.J. in Oakesm. The 
first part of the test is that the objective sought to be achieved by the 
impugned law must relate to concerns which are "pressing and substantial" in 
a free and democratic society. 
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right 
or freedom are designed to serve, must be "of sufficient importance to warrant 
overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom": R. v. Big M Drug 
Mart Ltd., supra, at p. 352. The standard must be high in order to ensure that 
objective which are trivial or discordant with the principles integral to a free and 
democratic society do not gain s. 1 protection. It is necessary, at a minimum, 
that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free 
and democratic society before it can be characterized as sufficiently important.I62 
In regard to the equality rights of s. 15, Wilson J. in Andrews, judged 
that such a test is an appropriate standard when it is recognized that not every 
distinction between individuals and group will violate s. 15. If every distinction 
did result in a violation of s. 15, then "this standard might well be too 
stringent for application in all cases and might deny the community at large 
the benefits associated with sound and desirable social and economic legisla-
tion"163. However, the Court in Andrews did not give s. 15 such broad 
application and because the equality provision was designed to protect those 
groups who suffer social, political and legal disadvantage in society, the 
159. D. GIBSON, supra, note 141, p. 151 ; see also ONTARIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra, note 157, 
p. 179-182. 
160. Supra, note 43, p. 983. 
161. Supra, note 96, p. 136-137 ; see also D. GIBSON, supra, note 141,p. 157; W.R. LEDERMAN, 
"Droits et libertés constitutionnels et conflit de valeurs: l'interprétation de la Charte et 
article 1", in G.A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushny, eds., supra, note 39, p. 176. 
162. Oakes, supra, note 96, p. 138; reaffirmed in Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 986; see also 
D. GIBSON, supra, note 141, p. 143-146. 
163. Supra, note 11, p. 154. 
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burden resting on the government to justify discrimination against such 
groups is appropriately an onerous one164. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this reasoning in an analogous case 
involving the protection of children as a group that is most vulnerable to 
commercial manipulation. In Irwin Toy the criterion of a "pressing and 
substantial" objective was further refined by judging that it was not open to 
the government to assert post facto a purpose which did not animate the 
legislation in the first place l65. However, in proving that the original objective 
remains pressing and substantial, the government can and should draw upon 
the best evidence currently available. The same is true as regards proof that 
the measure is proportional to its objectivel66. 
2.2.2. Proportionality of Means and Objectives 
The second part of s. 1 involves the balancing of a number of factors to 
determine whether the means chosen by the government are proportional to 
its objective167. The Court must consider the nature of the right, the extent of 
its infringement and the degree to which the limitation furthers the attainment 
of the legitimate goal of the legislation. As Dickson C.J. stated in Edwards 
Books : 
Second, the means chosen to attain those objectives must be proportional or 
appropriate to the ends. The proportionality requirement, in turn, normally has 
three aspects: the limiting measures must be carefully designed, or rationally 
connected, to the objective ; they must impair the right as little as possible ; and 
their effects must not so severely trench on individual or group rights that the 
legislative objective, albeit important, is nevertheless outweighed by the abridge-
ment of rights. , 68 
The legislature must be given sufficient scope to achieve its objective 169. 
As noted in the Edwards Books case, when struggling with questions of social 
policy and attempting to deal with conflicting pressures, a legislature must be 
given reasonable room to manoeuvre. 
164. Id. 
165. Supra, note 43, p 984 ; Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 79, p. 335. 
166. Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 984 ; Edwards Books, supra, note 97, p. 769 ; contra, Ford v. 
A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, p. 779-780 where it was judged that the evidence or 
rather lack of it, was insufficient. 
167. Oakes, supra, note 96, p. 139; reaffirmed in Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 991, and by 
Wilson J., Andrews, supra, note 11, p. 154-155 ; see also W.R. LEDERMAN, supra, note 161, 
p. 175 ; K.H. FOGARTY, supra, note 51, p. 332-333. 
168. Supra, note 97, p. 768; see also Q. v. Hufsky, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621. 
169. Black, supra, note 130, p. 627-628; Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 990; W.R. LEDERMAN, 
supra, note 161, p. 177-178. 
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Both in articulating the standard of proof and in describing the criteria 
comprising the proportionality requirement the Court has been careful to avoid 
rigid and inflexible standards. ,7° 
S. 1 of the Charter does not advocate perfection and the notion of flexibility is 
inherent in the term "reasonable limit." 
In Andrews, the reasoning advanced in support of the citizenship 
requirement for membership into a Bar of Law was judged not to have been 
rationally connected to its objectives, much less to have been carefully 
designed to achieve them with minimum impairment of individual rights. 
Therefore, the legislation was in violation of equality rights in s. 15 m . 
In the second aspect of the proportionality test, the party seeking to 
uphold the limit must demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the 
means chosen impair the freedom or right in question as little as possible. 
Although the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on the 
circumstances, in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of 
society with those of individuals and groupsl72. 
As a result, a legislature mediating between the claims of competing 
groups will be forced to strike a balance without the benefit of absolute 
certainty concerning how the balance is best struck m . Democratic institutions 
are meant to allow its citizens to share in the responsibility for these difficult 
choices. Thus, as courts review the results of the legislature's deliberations, 
particularly with respect to the protection of vulnerable groups, they must be 
mindful of the legislature's representative function174. In Irwin Toy, the 
Court did not take a restrictive approach to social science evidence, nor 
require legislatures to choose the least ambitious means to protect vulnerable 
groups. However, there had to be a sound evidentiary basis for the government's 
conclusions l75. 
In other cases, however, rather than mediating between different groups, 
the government is best characterized as the single antagonist of the individual 
whose right has been infringed. In such circumstances, and indeed whenever 
the government's purpose relates as an example to maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judicial system, the courts can access with some 
certainty whether the "least drastic means" for achieving the purpose has been 
chosen. The same degree of certainty may not be achievable in cases involving 
170. Supra, note 97, p. 768-764 ; Black, supra, note 130, p. 628. 
171. Stated by Wilson J., supra, note 11, p. 157. 
172. Oakes, supra, note 96, p. 139; Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 992-993. 
173. Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 993. 
174. Edwards Books, supra, note 97, p. 779. 
175. Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 999-1000; contra, Ford, supra, note 166. 
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the reconciliation of claims of competing individuals or groups or the 
distribution of scarce government resources176. 
The third and last aspect of the proportionality test may best be summed 
up by Dickson C.J. in Oakes. 
Even if an objective is of sufficient importance and the first two elements of the 
proportionality test are satisfied, it is still possible that because of the severity of 
the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups, the measure will 
not be justified by the purposes it is intended to serve. The more severe the 
deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the 
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.,77 
2.2.3. Selection Criteria : Reasonable Limits of Discrimination ? 
When first introduced, the Canadian immigration points system was 
hailed as a unique and unbiased selection process by which all independent 
applicants would be eveluated on the basis of their usefulness to the Canadian 
economy. However, as this study has shown, the selection criteria's highly-
touted appearance of impartiality seems somewhat tainted upon a closer 
examination of its legislative dispositions, meaning and consequences. In 
interpreting s. 15 of the Charter in a large and generous manner, consistent 
with Canadian jurisprudence, it would seem that the guarantee of equality 
rights in the independent immigrant selection criteria have been revealed to 
be more transparent than apparent. 
This part of the study will now examine the Items of the selection criteria 
found discriminatory earlier on for any reasonable limits that may be justified 
under s. 1 of the Charter. 
2.2.3.1. What's Age Have to Do with It ? 
Having proven that the age factor of Item 7 is discriminatory according 
to s. 15, the test of justification must now be applied to determine if the 
discriminatory limit is reasonable in a free and democratic society. The 
legislation in question is a regulation and therefore the limit is "prescribed by 
law." Also, the limits on age are sufficiently precise and clear in their wording. 
The discrimination based on age is direct in its intention and effect in that 
those immigrants who are too young or too old will be disadvantaged by the 
criteria178. 
176. Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 994. This reasoning was stated as an obiter, because the 
government acted as a mediator in the case, and not as an antogonist. 
177. Supra, note 96, p. 140. 
178. See part 2.2.1. of this study; M.E. ATCHESON and L. SULLIVAN, supra, note 109, p. 275; 
K.H. FOGARTY, supra, note 51, p. 367. 
512 Les Cahiers de Droit (1990) 31 C. de D. 477 
The onus of justification is on the part of the government and s. 8 (1) of 
Immigration Act, 1976 stating that the burden of proof of admission rights is 
on the immigrant, is not contrary to this principle because the former is 
dealing with the respect of constitutional guarantees involving immigration 
admissions and, the latter with immigration admissions itself179. 
The appropriate test here is that the objectives of the age limitation 
legislation must be "pressing and substantial" in order to be sufficiently 
important to override the guarantee of equality in s. 15. The objective related 
to this particular factor is paragraph 3(a) of the Immigration Act, 1976, 
which states : 
to support the attainment of such demographic goals as may be established by 
the Government of Canada from time to time in respect of the size, rate of 
growth, structure and geographic distribution of the Canadian population l8°. 
Keeping in mind the vulnerability of disadvantaged groups in Canadian 
society and that the proof of the objectives' importance can be made by the 
best evidence currently available, the pressing and substantial nature of the 
concerns cannot be disputed. As shown by the legislative history of the 
Immigration Act, planned demographic growth is a prime feature of the 
modern policy and is inherent in the nature of immigration policy itself181. 
The high level principles and objectives of the immigration policy has 
traditionally been viewed as, at best, vague rules of statutory construction, 
rather than as a form of enumerated rights. These statements of principle do 
not override the explicit statutory provisions, and by their breath and 
extensive nature would tend to come into conflict in even the most ordinary 
set of individual circumstances. On the whole, most decisions are made 
without reference to these principles, although they form an underlying 
rational of Canadian immigration policy, which requires a balance to be 
maintained between competing principles 182. However, with the advent of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the nature and role of these 
objectives have taken on a greater significance as they now serve as the basis 
upon which the guarantee of Charter rights are judged. 
179. Jolly v. M.M.I., [1975], F.C. 216, 54 D.L.R. (3d), 277, 7 N.R. 271 ; Germain v. Malouin, 
[1979], 2 F.C. 784, 101 D.L.R. (3d), 384 ; supra, note 5 ; see also J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, 
p. 40; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 96. 
180. Canada's Immigration Law, supra, note 31, p. 46 ; see also M.E. ATCHESON and L. SULLIVAN, 
supra, note 109, p. 276; supra, part 2.2.1. 
181. Asshownbys. 7 of Immigration Act, 1976, concerning the planning of immigration levels; 
see also H.G. HOWITH, supra, note 29, p. 1-3; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 44, 
J. JEAN, supra, note 102, p. 12. 
182. J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 15; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 72-73. 
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Next the proportionality test must be applied to the age limit legislation, 
to determine if means chosen by the government are proportional to its 
objective l83. The first aspect of this test involving the careful design and 
rationality of the objective is difficult to contest because of the very wording 
of the objective. The terms "to support the attainment of such demographic 
goals as may be established by the government... " seems to indicate that para-
graph 3(a) is an objective based on other objectives that are subservient to the 
government's discretion. The only other clue of what these other objectives 
may be is s. 7 of the Immigration Act, 1976, which sets the levels of 
immigration after consultation with the provinces. Therefore, it seems that 
the onus of justification by the government for this aspect of the proportionahty 
test will be based on its own discretionary powers concerning immigration 
levels 1M. 
In examining the minimal impairment aspect of the proportionality test, 
once again the vague nature of the limits' objective presents a problem. 
However, in considering the obiter by the Supreme Court in Irwin Toy, in 
cases where the government is the single antagonist of the individual and does 
not act as a mediator between competing groups, the criteria of the "least 
drastic means" should, perhaps, be applied by the courts in their assessment 
of the age discrimination. The same degree of certainty may prove a problem 
in the assessment of immigration law as compared to that concerning the 
maintenance of authority and impartiality of the judicial system. Nevertheless, 
the burden of proof for the government is still quite onerous, especially 
because of the requirement of a sound evidentiary basis for the government's 
conclusions that age discrimination is essential for achievement of its demo-
graphic goals 185. 
Finally, the deleterious aspect of the proportionality test may prove for 
the government the most difficult to justify because of the nature of the age 
discrimination. The equality rights in s. 15 of the Charter are applicable to 
everyone, including immigrants or other aliens. The justification of age 
discrimination by demographic goals that are themselves unsubstantiated 
and discretionary, opposes the very nature of equality rights by subjecting 
constitutional guarantees to administrative discretion. 
183. M.E. ATCHESON and L. SULLIVAN, supra, note 109, p. 277. 
184. J.H. GREY, supra, note 6, p. 28 ; C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 73. 
185. See part 2.2.2. of this study; recent studies have indicated the advantages of admitting 
younger immigrants to resolve in part the problem of an aging population that pays less 
taxes but requires more services, see Presse Canadienne, "Les immigrants versent plus 
d'argent dans le trésor fédéral qu'ils n'en retirent", 4/01/90, Le Soleil; A.H. AKBARI, Net 
Impact of different immigrant groups on Canadians — Research Abstract, Ottawa, 
Employment and Immigration Canada, 1989, p. 3 ; G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, supra, 
note 15, p. 5. 
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For these reasons and as already supported by recent jurisprudential 
developments on this subject, it is submitted that the discriminatory age limits 
in Item 7 of the s. 8 of the Immigration Regulations, 1978 are unreasonable 
and unjustifiable according to the test of s. 1 of the Charter186. 
2.2.3.2. Justifying Personal Subjectivity 
Given that the factor of personal suitability is discriminatory, according 
to s. 15 of the Charter, the government now has the onus of justifying this 
subjective limit based on administrative discretion. The impugned legislation 
is "prescribed by law" but the criterion of an "intelligible standard" defining 
the personal suitability factor or its exact assessment and allotment of points 
is, at best, questionable. Neitheir the legislation nor its accompanying 
directives provide a concise method for evaluating personal suitability in its 
content or its point distribution. In the present analysis, it is submitted that 
the visa officer is given "a plenary discretion to do whatever seems best in a 
wide set of circumstances ;" thus, there is no "limit" prescribed by lawl87. 
Provided that Item 9 satisfies the preliminary requirements of s. 1, the 
government then has to justify that the following objectives in s. 3 of 
Immigration Act, 1976 linked to the personal suitability factor are sufficiently 
"pressing and substantial"188. 
3(b) to enrich and strengthen the cultural and social fabric of Canada taking 
into account the federal and biligual character of Canada. 
3(i) to maintain and protect health, safety and good order of Canadian society. 
Once again, as in the case of the age factor, the importance of these 
objectives is shown by the role they have played in the legislative history of 
immigration law in Canada and its application in current immigration policy. 
Also, s. 27 of the Charter involving the guarantee of multiculturalism reaffirms 
the substantial nature of the first objective of cultural and social concerns189. 
The application of the triple-tiered proportionality test, comparing the 
means applied to the objectives desired, will demonstrate the critical problems 
resulting from the personal suitability factor190. In applying the test of 
186. Harrison and Stoff man, supra, note 111 ; Kwantlen Faculty Assn., supra, note 54 ; contra, 
McKinney, supra, note 111 ; where the age distinction was judged discriminatory by s. 15 of 
the Charter, but conforming to the s. 1 justification test. 
187. Irwin Toy, supra, note 43, p. 983; see part 2.2.1. of this study; Immigration Manual, 
I.S. 4.08, supra, note 63. 
188. See part 2.2.1. of this study; Canada's Immigration Law, supra, note 31, p. 46-47. 
189. See part 2.1.3. of this study; J. JEAN, supra, note 102, p. 6-7. 
190. See part 2.2.2. of this study; R. AHAND, supra, note 9, p. 110. 
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rationality or careful design to the means applied in Item 9, it is difficult to see 
how the subjective qualities enumerated within can reasonably or even 
rationally "enrich and strengthen the cultural and social fabric," or "maintain 
and protect the health, safety and good order of Canadian society." In 
reconsidering the earlier discussion of these terms concerning discrimination, 
even by interpreting these qualities in their most objective sense, the rational 
lien between objectives and means is not evidentl91. Item 9's lack of "careful 
design" in its wording has already been discussed in examining the vagueness 
of its limits. 
The application of the test of "minimal impairment" to Item 9 demonstrates 
once more the omnipotence of administrative discretion in immigration law. 
In reviewing the reasoning exposed in the testing of the age factor, it is 
submitted that the personal suitability factor fails miserably in its balancing 
of the interests of society with those of the applicants who are disadvantaged. 
Not only is the evaluation of the factor completely at the discretion of the visa 
officer in charge, but the subjective guidelines in Item 9 provide no discernable 
limits whatsoever in the scoring of this personal evaluation. It should be quite 
interesting to see what evidentiary proof the government has to offer in order 
to justify this discrimination by "personal subjectivity" "2 . 
The aspect of the deleterious effects of the preceding two tests. As 
discussed earlier in the section dealing with locus standi, all aliens have the 
right to the protection of Canadian constitutional guarantees. In allowing the 
power of administrative discretion to prevail over equality rights in s. 15, and 
multicultural rights in s. 27, it will not only be the discriminated immigrant 
who risks exclusion that will suffer, but also Canadian society as a whole, by 
this debasement of its fundamental rights and freedoms193. 
2.2.3.3. A Factor of Economics or Politics ? 
As was the case with the preceding factors, the prerequisite of the 
impugned limit being "prescribed by law" posed no problems as to the scope 
of the "law" because of the legislation concerned. The vagueness doctrine is 
neither applicable here, as all the factors in Items 2, 3 and 4 are clearly and 
painstakingly explained as well as their evaluation and distribution of points. 
The next step is the government's proof of a "pressing and substantial" 
191. It seems difficult to reconcile the "objective and universal" standards of the terms in Item 9 
with the cultural and social goals of s. 3 (b) which are subjective by nature. 
192. See part 2.2.3.1. of this study. 
193. See part 2.2.2. of this study ; R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 113; an analogous analysis may 
be made with Bhinder, supra, notes 151 and 86. 
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objective which shall be attempted by examining the following objectives of 
the occupational, experience and S.V.P. factors 194. 
3(b) (as outlined earlier in justifying the age factor and pertaining only to the 
S.V.P. and experience factors in this analysis.) 
3(h) to foster the development of a strong and viable economy and the 
prosperity of all regions in Canada. (This objective concerns all three 
Items 2, 3 and 4.) 
The pressing and substantial nature of these objectives is unconstested as 
the reasons for the very existence of immigration law and policy depend on 
these objectives l95. The problem, as usual, lies more in the application of the 
means chosen to achieve these objectives. 
In applying the proportionality test, the first hurdle faced will be the 
government's justification of the rationality or careful design of the impugned 
limits196. Once again, by examining only the occupational factor in light of 
s. 3(h), this analysis will be equally valid for Items 2 and 3 because of their 
interdependence. The relationship between s. 3(b) and the S.V.P. and experience 
factors shall not be examined in the framework of this study. However, it has 
been noted that this link applies more specifically to the self-employed class of 
business immigration who are required to establish a business in Canada that 
will contribute to the economy or the cultural or artistic life of Canada197. 
To examine the rationality in the link between Item 4 and s. 3(h), if in 
fact it exists, one must delve once more into the legislative history of the 
present Immigration Act. The elimination of the Department of Citizenship 
and Immigration in favour of a new Department of Manpower and Immigration 
in 1966 made clear the philosophy that immigration would be viewed as an 
element of domestic labour and economic policy. This reorganization was not 
accepted without reservations, as it appeared that effective long-range immi-
gration planning would become secondary to short-range, stop-gap measures, 
designed to fill immediate shortages of the labour force. As the Canadian 
economy began its decline in later years, immigration regulation reflected this 
trend and opponents of the government reorganization of manpower and 
immigration would see their predictions reflect reality. Identification of 
immigration considerations apart from short-term economic concerns would 
become difficult to discernl98. 
194. See part 2.2.1. of this study ; Canadian Immigration Law, supra, note 31, p. 45-46. 
195. See introduction of this study; supra, note 37. 
196. See part 2.2.2. of this study. 
197. S. 2(1) and s. 8 (IB) of Immigration Regulations, 1978, concerning respectively, the 
definition of a self-employed immigrant and his selection assessment ; Immigration Manual, 
l.S. 5.01 and 5.07; see also F.N. MARROCO, and H.M. GOSSETT, supra, note 36, p. 296. 
198. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p 58-61 ; see also R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 88. 
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This prediction turned-fact was realized once more in the early 1980's, 
when in response to rising unemployment, a restriction of selected workers 
was imposed, admitting only those with arranged employment ' " . The 
restriction ended only in 1985 with an expansion in economic immigration, as 
a response to economic recovery. However, the damage was already done, as 
the recession and its aftereffects resulted in the unfulfillment of the announced 
immigration planning ranges from 1982-1986200. Although as rationalized 
by the government, the immigration levels set by the Special Joint Committee 
of Parliament on Immigration Planning did not represent a quota or a target, 
they did indicate, as submitted by this study, to what point the present 
legislation was ineffective in providing long-range economic planning201. 
Recent demographic reports show that with Canada's falling birthrate, 
1.7 children/woman in 1988, the Canadian population will begin to decline 
by 2026 even if immigration continues at present 1989 levels202. This prospect 
will have troubling implications for Canada's economy, as noted earlier in the 
discussion of multiculturalism, because a declining workforce could be too 
small to support the country's social programs by the early years of the next 
century. This view was supported by a 1987 discussion paper by the Institute 
for Research on Public Policy, stating that population growth has a positive 
effect on economic growth203. The demographic factor in Item 7 was increased 
from 5 points to a maximum of 10 in 1986 in an effort, as claimed by the 
government, to permit a higher number of eligible applicants to be 
accepted204. 
In light of the analysis presented above, this study proposes that the 
occupational factor in Item 4 is not rationally connected to the objective of 
developing a strong and viable economy, as well as prosperity in all regions of 
Canada. The occupational factor is, at best, a short-range, stop-gap measure 
to fill immediate shortages of the labour force. This observation is supported 
by the use and purpose of the occupational list for point assessment, as well as 
by historical evidence. The pressing and substantial demographic concerns 
which invariably affect the economy demonstrate to what point the present 
199. H.G. HOWITH, supra, note 29, p. 16-27 ; G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 2. 
200. Id, p. 37. 
201. Id., 38 ; see also Canada's Immigration Law, supra, note 31, p. 5 ; the reasoning of the 
government's claim that the announced immigration levels are "only" global planning 
levels is questionable, for one may inquire of what possible use are predictions without a 
purpose or a goal. 
202. P. KOPVILLEN and others, supra, note 155, p. 16; G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, supra, 
note 15, p. 5 ; Future Immigration Levels, supra, note 121, p. 24. 
203. Id. ; H.G. HOWITH, supra, note 29, p. 38-39. 
204. H.G. HOWITH, supra, note 29, p. 31. 
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legislation is deficient in achieving its economic objectives, both long and 
arguably, short term205. 
In considering the test of minimal impairment, the "least drastic means" 
criterion should be the appropriate one in the balancing of society's interest 
with those of the individual or group206. With the government as arguably the 
sole antagonist, the disadvantaged immigrant is not only subjected to the 
whims of administrative discretion but also to the influence of powerful lobby 
groups on decisions of public policy regarding the point distribution in the 
occupational list. Economic policies may easily become political policies 
based on government reaction to public opinion, as demonstrated by the 
continued use of immigration restrictions during the recession207. 
By eliminating the occupational factor altogether, along with the S. V.P. 
and experience factors, there would still be an effective limit assuring the 
economic viability and employment of immigrants by Item 5, the assessment 
of Arranged Employment or Designated Occupation208. At the very least, the 
occupational factor should be restructured so that the distribution of points is 
less sensitive to fluctuations in the Canadian economy, and less subjective in 
its discretionary evaluation of occupations. Through these or other similar 
means, the indirect discriminatory effects on immigrants will be minimized 
and perhaps eliminated in whole. The government finding that "immigrants 
do not take jobs away from Canadians but rather contribute to economic 
growth and job creation," along with the official immigration job policy of 
"Canadians first," seems to contradict the underlying reason for occupational 
factor's restrictive selectivity209. 
The final aspect of deleterious effects can be easily demonstrated by the 
evident risks the disadvantaged immigrant faces by exclusion for inadequate 
point total, or even immediate disqualification. As stated in Oakes, this test 
need only be examined if the first two criteria have already been satisfied. 
205. P. KOPVILLEN and others, supra, note 155, p. 14-16 ; see also G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, 
supra, note 15, p. 5; R. CLEROUX, "Immigration revises list of desirable jobs", 18/11/89, 
The Globe and Mail in which the reliability and validity of the occupational list is 
questioned. 
206. See part 2.2.2. of the study. 
207. Immigration Manual, I.S. 4.08 and Appendix B; R. CLEROUX, supra, note 205 ; 
H.G. HOWITH, supra, note 29, p. 19-26 ; R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 88 ; see also J. JEAN, 
supra, note 102, p. 8. 
208. H.G. HOWITH, supra, note 29, p. 16; G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 2; 
C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 113 ; the reliance of the government on this factor to 
restrict immigration levels during the recession in the 1980's, is indicative of its effectiveness 
in implementing the "Canadians first" employment policy. 
209. C.J. WYDRZYNSKI, supra, note 3, p. 112-113; see also H.G. HOWITH, supra, note 29, p. 28; 
G. HERSAK and D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 8-9; V. MALAREK, supra, note 155. 
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Therefore, because the occupational factor failed primarily in its test of 
rationality, and secondly the test of minimal infringement, further analysis is 
unnecessary.210. 
Conclusion 
In the conflict between administrative discretion and equality rights, the 
rule of constitutional guarantees is supreme. The immigration system and in 
particular the selection criteria are reflections of the omnipresence of admi-
nistrative powers as shown throughout its legislative history. The distinction 
between rights and privileges in immigration law is no longer valid in regards 
to the protection of constitutional rights and all individuals or groups now 
have the locus standi to invoke the equality rights guaranteed in s. 15. The 
appropriate test for discrimination in s. 15 as elaborated in Andrews by the 
finding of a differential treatment and whether this differentiation was 
discriminatory, was applied to the selection criteria for indépendant immigrants. 
In determining discrimination for grounds analogous to those enumerated in 
s. 15, the key was the distinction between merits and personal characteristics. 
In this context, the factors of age, personal suitability, occupation, experience 
and specific vocational preparation were found to have disadvantaged certain 
independent immigrants in a discriminatory manner. Multiculturalism gua-
rantees were discussed as it was concluded that s. 27 should play an active role 
in promoting higher immigration levels as well as protecting multicultural 
rights in immigration law and policy. A more passive role was also assigned, 
as s. 27 would aid in the interpretation of other constitutional guarantees and 
especially the principle of non-discrimination in s. 15. Finally, once a legislative 
provision was judged discriminatory, the test of justification had to be 
applied to determine the reasonableness of these limits. The appropriate test, 
as stated in Oakes and refined later by jurisprudence, in particular Irwin Toy, 
was first, providing that the "limits were prescribed by law," to see if the 
concerns overriding the Charter guarantees were "pressing and subtantial" 
and if so, to apply the multi-tiered proportionality test. In considering the 
criteria of rationality or careful design of means to objectives, minimal 
impairment of constitutional rights, and the proportionality of the deleterious 
effects as to the objectives concerned, the Items 2,3,4,7 and 9 of the selection 
criteria that were judged discriminatory were found to be equally unreasonable 
for various reasons and in varying degrees. However, one aspect in which all 
three analyses were in consensus was the need for reform in immigration law 
and policy and, in particular, a tighter control of administrative discretion. 
210. See part 2.2.2. of the study. 
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A brief examination of the Canadian refugee system and its present 
urgent and critical situation will provide an excellent example of the true 
malaise of the Canadian immigration system. As discussed in the introduction, 
refugee law in Canada should be, according to its nature, a human-rights 
based protection system211. However, in every facet of its overseas refugee 
resettlement programs, Canada has institutionalized screening processes that 
effectively ensure the acceptability and productivity of the refugees it receives212. 
Refugees must either be privately sponsored or they must show that they 
possess an adequate mix of skills, formal preparation and aptitudes to permit 
them to become self-sufficient and contributing members of society. Notwith-
standing Canada's commitments to the advancement of international human 
rights law2I3, the government has constructed a refugee law that is fundamentally 
premised to safeguard and advance its own domestic well-being. Thus 
humanitarian concerns are sacrificed for economic concerns.214. 
The recent abuse of the refugee process, before implementation of Bills 
C-55 and C-84, was caused as much by the undue harshness and discriminatory 
nature of Canadian immigration law, as by improper exploitation of the 
system by applicants2I5. Apart from the discriminatory nature of the selection 
criteria as discussed in this study, a variety of other regulations remain overtly 
discriminatory. The differential treatment of prospective visitors from different 
countries under Schedule II of Immigration Regulations, 1978 which lists 
those nations from which visas are not required in advance of arrival in 
Canada is questionable216, as well as the three designated refugee classes 
(from Indochinese, Latin American, and Communist countries) with varying 
requirements of proof in spite of Canada's international commitments in 
refugee law217. On the administrative level, the uneven distribution of 
Canadian immigration offices throughout the world have resulted in de facto 
discrimination on the basis of national origin, because of the visa distribution 
211. J.C. HATHAWAY, .supra, note 33, p 357; B. SEGAL, supra, note 33, p. 735; G. HERSAKand 
D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 3. 
212. J.C. HATHAWAY, "A Selected Concern : An Overview of Refugee Law in Canada", (1988) 
33 McGill L.J. 676, p. 714 ; G. HERSAK, and D. THOMAS, supra, note 15, p. 3. 
213. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28/07/51, 189 U.N.T.S., p. 150; 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31/01/67, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
214. J.C. HATHAWAY, supra, note 212, p. 714-715. 
215. J.H. GREY,supra,note 58,p. 597;P. DUQUETTE.J. YEDmandM. WEIGEL,supra,note 33; 
J.C. HATHAWAY, supra, note 212, p. 676 s. 
216. S. 9 of Immigration Act. 1976, and s. 13 of Immigration Regulations, 1978, concerning 
visitor visa; P. DUQUETTE, J. YEDID and M. WEIGEL, supra, note 33. 
217. Respectively, Indochinese Designated Class Regulations, S.O.R./78-931 ; Political Prisoners 
and Oppressed Persons Designated Class Regulations, S.O.R./82-977; and Self-Exiled 
Persons Class Regulations, S.O.R./78-933 ; R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 122. 
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principle of "first-come, first served." Although recent legislative and admi-
nistrative measures have been taken to alleviate this problem, the fact remains 
that the Canadian government's failure to provide the necessary resources is a 
denial of equality rights218. In light of these formidable obstacles, and as 
always the pervasiveness of administrative discretion in immigration law and 
policy, it is not suprising that many desperate immigrants have tried to gain 
admission into Canada in the guise of "economic refugees"219. 
In concluding this study, a closing remark must be made concerning the 
present immigration administration's obsession with short-term "get-rich-
quick" policies and its special business immigration program. Immigration 
requirements for business immigrants such as self-employed applicants, 
entrepreneurs, or investors are assessed under a relaxed set of criteria to 
encourage the admission of wealthy foreigners220. Critics have claimed that 
the policy has failed to deliver clear economic benefits, while discriminating 
against many potential immigrants who are not wealthy221. The indirect 
effects of this discrimination as assessed by s. 15 were discussed earlier in this 
study. Visas are given on the intent of applicants' promises, but the monitoring 
system is inadequate and many federal officials suspect the unfulfillment of 
these promises222. 
In the end, this policy, atypical of the recent evolution of immigration 
law, may be undermining other types of immigration. With the heavy 
criticism Canada received in its encouragement of the immigration of profes-
sionals from underdeveloped nations through the point system the government 
soon after took special legislative and administrative measures to "discriminate" 
against these occupations223. However, the "brain drain" of the 1970's has 
now been transformed into a " money drain" of the 1980's, depriving 
underdeveloped nations of valuable sources of capital and investment. 
Finally, as shown by recent demographic and economic studies, the present 
immigration policy's economic benefits are still uncertain and may be even 
218. H.G. HOWITH, supra, note 29, p. 6; R. ANAND, supra, note 9, p. 122; J.H. CUFF, "Film 
raises tough questions about immigration policy", 21/11/89, The Globe and Mail. 
219. Supra, note 215. 
220. In particular Schedule I s. 3, 8, 9 and 11 of Immigration Regulations, 1978; see also 
Immigration Manual, I.S. 5, supra, note 63, concerning business immigration. 
221. D. BURKE, S. SHARIFF, and T. TEDESCO, "The Moneyed Class", 10/07/89, Maclean's, 
p. 19; D. STOFFMAN, supra, note 156, p. 129 ; J.H. CUFF, supra, note 218. 
222. Id. 
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counterproductive in the long term. As succinctly and appropriately put by 
Dan Heap, N.D.P. Immigration Critic, "We don't need to sell visas. What 
builds the country is work, not money"224. 
224. D. BURKE,S. SHARiFF.andT. TEDESCO,supra,note 221,p. 19;seealsoJ.H. CUFF,supra, 
note 218, in which the unsettling knowledge is revealed that neither our ancestors, nor most 
of us, would qualify to emigrate to Canada under the present immigration law. 
